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Matthew Taylor, Patrick Field, Using Mediation in Canadian
Lawrence Susskind and Environmental Tribunals:
William Tilleman** Opportunities and Best
Practices*
The popularity of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) has been growing for
decades, particularly in the United States and now in Canada. Although ADR has
become increasingly popular in the Canadian administrative context, it faces
certain difficulties arising from the public interest mandate of many tribunals, in
particular environmental tribunals. These difficulties include conventional and
institutional problems, such as conflict assessment, communications with and
between parties, selecting and training the mediator (tribunal member, staff, or
third party?), and identification of the proper parties and competing interests.
There are also concerns specific to Canadian environmental tribunals. How do
they protect the public interest, handle complex technical and scientific issues,
enforcement, confidentiafity, and deal with the precedential value of mediated
decisions?
La popularitM des m6canismes de reglements des conffits (MRC) ne cessent de
crottre depuisplusieurs d6cennies, en particulieraux Etats-Unis etmaintenantau
Canada. Bien que les MCRjouissentd'unepopularite croissante dans le contexte
administratif canadien, elles font face i certaines difficult6s d6coulant du mandat
de protection de I'int6rt public de bon nombre de tribunaux, en particulier les
tribunaux environnementaux. Ces difficultes relevent tant des conventions que
des institutions; citons entre autres I'6valuation de conflit, les communications
avec les parties et entre elles, la s6lection et la formation de mediateurs (membre
du tribunal, membre du personnel ou tierce partie?), et l'identification des parties
appropriees etdes rivalit6s d'int6r6t. Les tribunauxenvironnementauxcanadiens
sont aux prises avec des difficultes particulieres. Comment peuvent-ils prot6ger
l'intrt public, trancher des questions scientifiques et techniques complexes,
veiller au respect de la loi, assurer la confidentialit6 et enfin, dans quelle mesure
doivent-ils accorder une valeur de prdcddent aux dcisions r6sultant d'une
m~diation?
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two-day workshop conducted to train administrative tribunal members across Canada in
mediation techniques and practices.
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Introduction
Enthusiasm for the expanded use of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) in Canadian environmental law has been growing.' The federal
government and some provincial governments have enacted legislation
implementing a variety of ADR methods and techniques in various
administrative contexts.' In addition, environmental tribunals have been
using ADR techniques, mostly on an ad hoc basis and, in a few tribunals,
on a more formal basis.3 It is clear that most of this activity has been
shaped by the growing popularity of ADR in the context of Canadian civil
litigation, and in several other areas of public law. It also appears that they
1. The phrase "alternative dispute resolution" generally refers to any type of procedure used
to resolve disputes other than litigation; S. Goldberg et. al., Dispute Resolution: Negotiation,
Mediation and Other Processes (Boston: Little Brown, 1992) at 3-5. In the environmental law
field, this would include procedures used to resolve disputes other than formal administrative
hearings. In Canada, such procedures can be found in pre-hearings, or preliminary meetings
used by administrative tribunals.
2. In recent years, there has a been a great deal of discussion concerning ADR reform in the
Canadian civil litigation system. Some of the recent and notable governmental task force
reports advocating ADR reform include the Ontario Civil Justice Review, Supplemental and
Final Report (Toronto: Ontario Civil Justice Review, 1996) [hereinafter Supplemental and
Final Report], the Law Society of Upper Canada's Subcommittee on Dispute Resolution
Report Summary (Toronto: Law Society of UpperCanada, 1993), theCanadian Bar Association's
Task Force on ADR Report, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa:
Canadian Bar Association, 1989), and the Alberta Law Reform Institute's Dispute Resolution:
A Directory of Methods, Programs, and Resources (Edmonton: The Institute, 1990). The
provincial Ontario government took a bold step in the direction of implementing some of the
suggested reforms when, in 1997, it introduced mandatory court-annexed ADR in all civil
cases, to be phased in during 1998. In addition, there has been an exponential increase in
academic writing in the Canadian ADR field in recent years. See, generally, J. Goss, "An
Introduction to Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1995) 34 Alta. L. Rev. I at 3.
3. For example, Andromache Karakatsanis, the former Vice-President of the Society of
Ontario Adjudicators and Regulators, has stated that "[o]ver the last few years, Ontario
tribunals have been re-thinking their mandates. We have seen a gradual shift from a rights-
oriented legalistic model of adjudication to a more community accessible pragmatic approach
to resolving disputes in a way that provides a better service to our customers." In a survey of
19 administrative tribunals in Ontario, she found that 15 of them used some form of ADR; 12
used pre-hearing and settlement conferences and 9 employed a mediation process. A.
Karakatsanis; "Problem-Solving with ADR: The Tribunal Perspective" (1995) 9 Can. J.
Admin. L. & Prac. 125 at 126, 129.
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have been influenced by the writings of academics and practitioners
claiming impressive cost and time savings through the use of ADR.4
Despite growing interest, ADR is still at an early stage of development
in the Canadian administrative context. In contrast to the United States,
where the use of ADR in environmental and other administrative settings
is relatively well-established,5 ADR does not currently play a central role
in the administration of Canadian environmental law.6 Even though
reforms have been instituted in some jurisdictions, particularly on the
provincial level, to date there has not been a systematic effort to catalogue
ADR activities in each Canadianjurisdiction. The lack of such a study has
4. The advantages of ADR, both generally and in the environmental context, have been well-
documented. Some of the reasons generally cited in favour of the implementation of ADR
reform in the environmental field include the "high costs and delays involved with environ-
mental litigation; the nature of certain environmental problems, such as cleanup orders, where
obligations and shared liabilities can be settled before a final consent decree; the development
of certain projects where there is room for discussion on how and where to build; and the
regulatory and standard setting process, where there is a possibility that the standards can be
agreed upon in advance"; W. Tilleman, "Environmental Appeal Boards: A Comparative Look
at the United States, Canada and England" (1996) 21 Colum. J. Env. L. 1 at 69-70 [hereinafter
"Environmental Appeal Boards."] Most of the relevant studies show that: 1) the parties tend
to be more satisfied with the results of ADR as compared with litigation or administrative
adjutication; 2) there are fewer joint gains left unclaimed; 3) relationships among the
stakeholders are improved making implementation of agreements easier; and 4) ADR costs less
and takes less time. L. Susskind, P. Levy, & J. Thomas-Larmer, Negotiating Environmental
Agreements, (Thousand Oaks, California: Island Press, 1999), and L. Balow & M. Wheeler,
Environmental Dispute Resolution (New York: Plenum Press, 1984).
5. Alternative dispute resolution, and specifically mediation, has been in use in the American
environmental context for over twenty years; see generally A. Mehta, "Resolving Environmen-
tal Disputes in the Hush-Hush World of Mediation: A Guideline for Confidentiality" (1997)
10 Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 521 [hereinafter "Resolving Environmental Disputes"]. Frank
Grad has observed that, in the United States, ADR-and ADR inspired approaches-are
currently used in a variety of environmental law contexts, including negotiated rule-making,
negotiation of consent decrees, civil enforcement actions, and in the negotiation of land use and
public land and resources issues. F. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law, looseleaf (New
York: Matthew Bender, 1973) at para. 15.01-15.06.
6. Very little has been written on this topic in Canada, and there is clearly a need for more a
systematic approach to policy-making. For example, Elizabeth Swanson has observed that the
use of ADR techniques in the environmental context in Canada has been "an informal
development; the result of governmental or private initiative rather than carefully structured
law or policy"; E.J. Swanson, "Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental Conflict:
The Case for Law Reform" (1995) 34 Alta. L. Rev. 267 at 268. However, there are increasing
calls for greater institutionalization. Vanderburgh and Hope make the case for it in the
following terms: "[a]dvocates of institutionalized environmental mediation believe that
institutionalization makes the process of mediation more predictable, provides a clear mecha-
nism for enforcing the agreement and protects the parties that elect to use it, thereby
encouraging its use. Institutionalization should also contribute to more successful mediation,
measured not only by the numbers of agreements reached but by an increase in community
participation in those agreements." E. Vanderburgh & A. Hope, "Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion" in C. Sandborn, ed., Law Reform for Sustainable Development in British Columbia
(Vancouver: Canadian Bar Association, 1990) 16, cited in Swanson, ibid. at 272.
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left legislators and tribunals without a clear sense of what their counter-
parts in other jurisdictions are doing. When Canadian tribunals have
proceeded into the new territory of ADR, each tribunal has had to go it
alone, proceeding "from scratch."
With its touted benefits and more widespread use in the U.S., there is
a great deal of enthusiasm for proceeding quickly in order to capture the
presumed benefits of ADR. Proponents have stated that ADR saves time,
saves money, better meets the interests of the parties, produces better
outcomes and ensures better compliance with agreements reached. 7
However, there are good reasons to proceed with caution. ADR, like
litigation, can be practised well or practised poorly. In particular, prior to
institutionalizing ADR, it is important to understand whether there are
features of the Canadian administrative system that must be given special
attention. As Alan Reid has observed:
Bringing ADR into administrative law involves more than simply engraft-
ing upon the mandate of an agency additional statutory powers authorizing
mediation and arbitration. It requires thinking more deeply about regula-
tion, government, law and public administration, in many ways that seem
unconventional for lawyers who have been schooled in, and indoctrinated
with, conventional thinking about the 'rule of law' and how courts enforce
it though judicial review.'
In their book Designing Conflict Management Systems, Costantino
and Merchant make the critical point that, in designing and improving
conflict management systems, the idea of ADR as "alternative" dispute
resolution is perhaps less useful than the concept of ADR as "appropriate"
dispute resolution.9 There are, in fact, many ADR options available
7. See the following. T. Melling, "Bruce Babbitt's Use of Governmental Dispute Resolution:
A Mid-Term Report Card" (1995) 30 Land and Water L. Rev. 57 at 85 [hereinafter "The Use
of ADR Methods"]. B.C. Mank, "The Two-Headed Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up
Hazardous Waste Dumps: Can Economic Incentives or Mediation Slay the Monster?" (1991)
19 Boston Coll. Env. Affairs L. Rev. 239 at 281 [hereinafter "The Two-Headed Dragon"]. D.
Singer, "The Use of ADR Methods in Environmental Disputes" (1992) 47 Arbitration J. 55 at
58 [hereinafter "The Use of ADR Methods"]. J.G. Smith, "Alternative Dispute Resolution and
the Wetlands Manual Debate: Could Negotiated Rulemaking Have Avoided the Impasse?"
(1994) 9 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Res. 415 at 417. L. Susskind, A. Chayes, P. Field & D.S.
McKearnan, "Partnering, Consensus Building, and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Current
Uses and Opportunities in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" (Cambridge, Mass.: The
Consensus Building Institute, 1995), section 5 at 13. E. Netter, "Mediation in a Land Use
Context" [1995] Institute on Planning, Zoning and Eminent Domain 31. J.C. Sassaman, Jr.,
"Siting Without Fighting: The Role of Mediation in Enhancing Public Participation in Siting
Radioactive Waste Facilities" (1992) 2 Alb. L.J. Sci.& Tech. 207 at 234.
8. A. Reid, "Seeing Regulation Differently: An ADR Model of Policy Formulation, Imple-
mentation and Enforcement" (1995) 9 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 101 at 102.
9. C. Costantino & C. Merchant, Designing Conflict Management Systems: A Guide to
Creating Productive and Healthy Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1996) at 41.
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ranging from those that are modestly invasive and allow the parties to
retain the most control over the process (such as mediation) to those that
are much more invasive and allow the parties less control over the process
and outcome (such as arbitration). The rules governing the use of various
dispute resolution procedures need to be legislated and implemented very
carefully.
In this regard, it is important to keep in mind, as Dianne Saxe has
observed, that environmental disputes are public, and not private.'0
Private disputes are well suited to ADR, and mediation in particular,
because the parties "own" their dispute and have the right to settle it. By
contrast, the key characteristic of a public dispute is that it affects the
public interest and the rights of others who may not be direct parties to the
dispute." In public disputes, determination of the "affected" parties is not
simple. In environmental disputes, more specifically, who precisely is
affected and ought to have a place at the table becomes even more
difficult. In addition to human beings and organizations that have legal
standing, there are ecological receptors (flora and fauna) often directly
affected by environmental decisions. They are presumably "represented"
by a government agency under the banner of the public interest.'2 But in
an ever increasing circle of affected parties, because ecosystems rarely
match up tidily with political and legal boundaries, one provincial agency
may not have jurisdiction over the breadth of the ecosystem in question.
Furthermore, environmental advocacy groups may be better suited to this
role. These groups often take on the mantle of champion of and spokes-
person for the environment, unencumbered by the need to balance
economic and environmental concerns. To make matters even more
complicated, in environmental disputes there are future generations who
will inherit the irreparable destruction wrought by today's actions (the
extinction of endangered species, for instance, or impacting "sustainable
development" which is the basis for Canadian environmental legisla-
tion' 3 ). Who will represent them?
10. D. Saxe, "Environmental ADR" in A. Stitt, ed., Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice
Manual (North York: CCH Canadian Limited, 1996) 1451 at 4272 [hereinafter "Environmen-
tal ADR"].
11. Ibid. at 4276.
12. In fact, this presumption is not always true, at least not in Canada. In Oldman RiverSociety
v. Canada (Minister of Transport) (1992), 7 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) I (S.C.C.), the federal Minister
of Environment was found to have not adequately represented the public interest in this seminal
environmental decision at the Supreme Court of Canada, with costs distributed back to the
environmental group.
13. See, e.g., the Preamble to the Canadian Environmental AssessmentAct, S.C. 1992, c. 37.
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Given these policy considerations, some ADR techniques may simply
be inappropriate and/or inadequate in a public dispute context. For
example, when the primary question is whether or not a party's legal
rights have been abridged, adjudication rather than mediation could be
more appropriate. When there is a need to set a legal precedent, mediation
is not appropriate. Finally, when a key party is unwilling to "come to the
table" because no agreement is a good outcome as far as they are
concerned, mediation cannot proceed.
The legislators responsible for designing ADR systems and the admin-
istrative agencies and tribunals responsible for implementing them must
move carefully to balance the public interest with the rights and needs of
the parties involved. This paper seeks to consider this concern along with
nine key issues, particularly from the standpoint of provincial level
environmental tribunals. While environmental mediation can be used in
a wide variety of administrative, legislative, and judicial contexts, our
focus is its role in the work of environmental tribunals. The nine key
issues are:
(1) Should tribunal members rely on inside or outside mediators and
how can skilled mediators best be identified by the tribunals who
decide to use them?
(2) What role, if any, should tribunal Board members themselves
play during case in-take (i.e., pre-mediation interviews) if a
tribunal decides to use mediation?
(3) How should tribunals handle complex technical and scientific
issues within the context of settlement negotiations?
(4) Should confidentiality be protected in ADR proceedings?
(5) Should ADR processes be mandatory?
(6) What role should tribunals or courts play in the procedural and
substantive review of negotiated settlements of docketed cases?
(7) What role, if any, should tribunals play in enforcing and ensuring
compliance with agreements reached during mediation?
(8) Should mediated or negotiated agreements have precedent-
setting value?
(9) What statutory basis, if any, is needed to conduct mediation
within the context of administrative hearings?
In this paper, we provide answers to these questions based, in part, on
a series of telephone interviews completed in the spring of 1998 with the
heads of key environmental tribunals across Canada.14 The interview
14. The identities of the interviewees have been omitted for reasons of confidentiality.
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protocol is attached (Appendix IV). We also codify our conclusions by
proposing a Model Law (Appendix III). As will be made clear in the paper
and Model Law, the answers to these questions must be understood
contextually, with a view to the specific administrative functions of the
tribunals in question. The idea behind the Model Law is to provide a
general framework for ADR administration, subject to the circumstances
in question.
I. The Canadian Administrative Environmental Context: A Brief
Regulatory Overview
In Canada, jurisdiction over environmental management is shared by
federal and provincial entities 5 and, at present, a substantial portion of
the management and enforcement of environmental statutes is under-
taken by both. To understand the use of ADR in environmental adminis-
trative disputes, it is important to recognize that the Canadian administra-
tive framework encompasses several overlapping regulatory regimes and
a spectrum of administrative agencies and tribunals. One example is the
federal-provincial harmonization strategy for environmental assessment.
With respect to environmental regulatory regimes, the Canadian legisla-
tive framework can be broken down into three broad categories: stan-
dards enforcement, environmental approvals, and sectoral regulation. 6
15. See, generally, P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Scarborough.:
Carswell, 1997) at 29-19 - 29-22.
16. M. Jeffrey, Environmental Approvals in Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Butterworths,
1989) at 1.1.
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Standards enforcement legislation aims at regulating deleterious im-
pacts by means of enforcement of environmental standards. 7 As Jeffery
notes, this approach is "curative" rather than "preventative" in the sense
that it is applicable only where a person or company has already impaired
the environment. By contrast, environmental approvals legislation is
"preventative." It is meant as a planning tool to provide a governmental
decision-maker with an objective standard, building on environmental
assessment methods, to grant or deny project approval. 8 Sectoral regu-
17. Ibid. Although there is no uniformity between the various federal and provincial
enactments in this regard, there are, as Kernaghan Webb has observed, enough common
elements to suggest a basic cross-jurisdictional legislative model. Typically, under such a basic
legislative model, a regime for licensing and controlling contaminant discharges is established.
Branches of either licensing requirements or of terms and conditions of licenses are established
as quasi-criminal offences. In addition, the Minister in question is generally given an array of
powers to issue administrative orders in the event of an unapproved discharge of contaminants.
K. Webb, "Pollution Control in Canada: The Regulatory Approach in the 1980s" Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Admin. Law Series (1988) at 14-15, in E. Hughes, A. Lucas & W.
Tilleman, Environmental Law And Policy (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1998)
[hereinafter Environmental Law and Policy]. A good example of such an approach is found in
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th supp.), c. 16 which gives the
federal Minister of the Environment the authority to set environmental quality guidelines, and
which proscribes the unlawful discharge of contaminants into the water, land or any part of the
environment. Similar legislation exists in each of the ten provinces. For example, in Ontario,
the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 19, contains general prohibitions against
the discharge of contaminants into the environment which would cause an adverse effect, and
empowers the Minister of the Environment, and Ministry officials ("Directors"), to establish
specific discharge limits through regulation, and to issue administrative orders, and vests
provincial officers with a wide array of investigative and enforcement powers with respect to
environmental offences. Other examples include the Alberta Environmental Protection and
EnhancementAct, S.A. 1992, c. E- 13.3; the Nova Scotia EnvironmentAct, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 1,
the British Columbia Waste Management Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 482; and the Manitoba
Environment Act, S.M. 1987-88, c.26.
18. Environmental assessment legislation varies from one jurisdiction to another but, in
general terms, it is a public mechanism or process for assessing the potential environmental
impacts of a proposed activity or undertaking. An environmfiental assessment is made up of a
number of steps, ranging from the pre-screening of proposed activities or undertakings to
determining whether they should be subject to a detailed assessment of potential impacts, to
a decision or recommendation from a hearing body. P. Emond & W. Tilleman "Environmental
Impact Assessment" in Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 17 at 211. A good example
is the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, which requires federal
authorities and private parties which are the proponents of certain works or projects (such as
dams, roads and the like) falling within a list or class of works projects specified in
accompanying regulations, to undergo an environmental assessment process. The purpose is
to determine whether the project is likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects.
Similarly, under the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 18, as am. by
S.O. 1996, c. 27, s. 3, a proponent to whom the Act applies must prepare terms of reference for
an environmental assessment and submit them to the Minister of the Environment and Energy
for approval. Once the terms of reference have been approved, an assessment must be
submitted for review by either the Minister or, where the Minister refers it to the Environmental
Assessment Board, by the Board.
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lation cuts across both and includes all statutes which establish adminis-
trative agencies to regulate with respect to one particular aspect of the
environment, or with respect to a sector of the economy in which
environmental considerations come into play.' 9
Apart from these three legislative regimes, there are numerous admin-
istrative processes established under both federal and provincial legisla-
tion. Agencies can function in one of three (sometimes overlapping)
modes20 : (1) judicial or quasi-judicial2 ; (2) administrative 22; and (3)
rule-making. In each mode, environmental agencies are expected to
undertake specific tasks, such as investigations, reporting to and advising
the Minister, adjudication and appeals, 23 and setting standards and
making rules. Often these overlap, and many agencies employ more than
one at a time. There are important distinctions among the different types
of environmental agencies in Canada and the methods they employ.
Administrative appeal boards are typically established at "arm's
length" from the provincial or federal environmental agency for which
they hear appeals (or advise on broader rule-making.) For instance, the
Ontario Environmental Appeal Board's mandate "is to provide an inde-
pendent and impartial review of the Director's actions and to consider
19. Good examples are the National Energy Board (which regulates interprovincial pipeline
construction and oil/gas/electricity exports, and which must often conduct an environmental
assessment as part of its regulatory mandate under the National Energy BoardAct, R.S.C. 1985,
c. N-7), and the Ontario Energy Board (which regulates the natural gas industry within Ontario
and has jurisdiction to take environmental considerations into account under the Ontario
Energy Board Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 0-13). Other relevant federal legislation includes such
statutes as the Forestry Development and Research Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-30, the Canada
Wildlife Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-9, and the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14, all of which
establish some form of administrative agency to administer the provisions of the legislation.
The various provinces each have sectoral legislation along these lines.
20. See generally R.W. MacAuley, Practice and Procedure Before Administrative Tribu-
nals, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) at 2-7 [hereinafter Practice and Procedure].
21. R. Reid & H. David, Administrative Law and Practice, 2d ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,
1978) at 126, have described this expression as a "term coined to denote the existence of court-
like characteristics in extra-judicial tribunals." An agency will be generally be considered to
be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity where it holds a formal hearing and conducts proceedings
in a manner analogous to a trial.
22. This refers to cases where the agency is concerned primarily with the management and
administration of a particular statutory regime. Where an agency is acting in administrative
mode, any public hearings will generally be conducted in a more informal and open-ended
manner than when acting in a quasi-judicial mode.
23. Where an agency is acting in the adjudicative mode, it will be making decisions or
carrying out acts affecting the rights and obligations of citizens, such as granting permits and
settling disputes. In this regard, it must be distinguished from agencies which only make a non-
binding report to the Minister responsible. See generally, R. Dussault & L. Borgeat, Admin-
istrative Law: A Treatise, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 122-123.
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whether the Director has acted fairly, in a manner that protects the
environment, and in accordance with law. 24 However, just like the
administrative agencies with which they are affiliated, tribunals may
serve in an administrative, quasi-judicial, or even legislative function,
with jurisdiction over enforcement, approval, or sectoral regulation.
As an illustration of the differences across tribunals, consider the
mandates and processes employed by the Ontario Energy Board, the
Quebec Bureau d' audiences publiques sur 1' environnement (BAPE), and
the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board. The Ontario Energy Board was
created to regulate natural gas utilities and to advise the Minister of
Environment and Energy on energy matters. 25 In this regard, it is a
tribunal that falls within the category of "sectoral regulation," and
primarily fulfills a rule-making or regulatory function. Despite the fact
that it carries out what might be considered policy-oriented functions, it
operates, nonetheless, in a quasi-judicial mode. The Board carries out its
regulatory function in contested public hearings pursuant to a detailed
and formal set of Rules of Practice and Procedure. Its hearings are "trial-
like" and the Board renders a final decision at the end of each hearing
which has the force of law. Thus, although it acts in some respects in an
"administrative" mode, it acts in others in a "quasi-judicial" mode.
The BAPE, which is Quebec's environmental hearings board, operates
under a very different mandate and, for that reason, employs different
administrative procedures. Unlike the Ontario Energy Board, the BAPE
carries out neither an adjudicatory function nor a regulatory function; it
has no independent decision-making power. Rather, it operates primarily
as a governmental advisory body, reporting directly to the Minister of the
Environment and Wildlife. 26 Its role is to inform and confer with the
public on environmental issues or projects, subject to environmental
24. Ontario Environmental Appeal Board Annual Report, April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997
at 4.
25. The Ontario Energy Board is established pursuant to the Ontario Energy Board Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. 0-13 and regulates the natural gas industry in Ontario. It sets rates, approves
the construction of infrastructure, approves franchise agreements between utilities and
municipalities and licenses gas storage facilities. The Board is a quasi-judicial board, protected
by a privative clause with a final power of decision.
26. In Bellefleurv. Quebec (P.G.), [1993] R.J.Q. 2320 (C.A.), the Quebec Court of Appeal
confirmed that the BAPE has the power only to gather information and make recommendations
to the Minister. The Minister is not bound by BAPE's opinions or suggestions. P. Renaud, "The
Environmental Assessment Process and Public Participation in Quebec: Concrete Elements for
Sustainable Development" (1996) 27 R.G.D. 375 at 378-79 [hereinafter "The Environmental
Assessment Process"].
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impact and review procedures. It submits a report of its findings to the
Minister. BAPE's mandate falls quite clearly within the category of
"preventative" legislation. As with the Ontario Energy Board, the BAPE
has a mandate to conduct public hearings, and these hearings are adversarial
in nature. However, these hearings are not conducted in a quasi-judicial
mode. Although the BAPE relies on elaborate and systematic procedures
for the conduct of these hearings, it does not employ the same strict
evidentiary rules as the Ontario Energy Board, and has a more open-
ended style of operation. For this reason, it is more accurately described
as working in an "administrative" rather than a "quasi-judicial" mode.27
The Alberta Environmental Appeal Board (EAB) falls somewhere
between the Ontario Energy Board and the BAPE in terms of the mandate
it exercises and the processes it employs.28 The EAB offers an appeal
process for appellants dissatisfied with decisions made by environmental
regulators on a wide range of environmental issues.29 In this respect, it
exercises what is clearly a "quasi-judicial" function. The Alberta EAB
makes final decisions on administrative penalties, and under the new
Water Act for other appeals as well.30 However, in most other cases, the
Alberta EAB does not have final decision-making authority. The Minis-
ter of the Environment renders final decisions in appeals dealing with
approvals, licenses, and other matters. In addition, in carrying out its
functions, the Alberta EAB has all the powers of a Commissioner under
public inquiries legislation, including the ability to retain experts and to
compel persons or evidence to be brought before the Board. Thus, unlike
the Ontario Energy Board, the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board
27. First, it has the mandate to hold public information and consultation sessions on various
types of projects, including road construction, dams, power lines, construction of airports and
the like, in addition to waste disposal sites. Second, the BAPE has the mandate, also at the
Minister's request, to institute commissions to conduct general public inquiries and media-
tions. The BAPE may also be entrusted with special mandates such as the public review of
government policy or programs. These types of projects are subject to the environmental
impact and assessment review procedure under s. 2 of the Regulation Respecting Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment and Review, R.R.Q. 1981, c. Q-2, r. 9. See generally "The Environmen-
tal Assessment Process," ibid. at 378, 380.
28. The Alberta Environmental Appeal Board was created under the Environmental Protec-
tion and Enhancement Act, S.A. 1992, c. E- 13.3 and handles the following types of appeals:
appeals from approvals required under the Act for a broad range of activities; appeals from
decisions made by a Director including the issuance of environmental protection orders; the
assessment of environmental issues and cases involving adverse environmental impact on air,
water and soil; and hearing appeals related to control orders concerning hazardous wastes and
contaminated sites.
29. "Environmental Appeal Boards," supra note 4 at 3.
30. See, e.g., ss 114, 115 of the Water Act, S.A. 1996, c. W-3.5, proclaimed on January 1,
1999.
Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices 63
exercises fact-finding, decision-making, and reporting functions and
operates, in some ways, in an "administrative" mode as well as in its
"quasi-judicial" mode. As Tilleman explains, the Board is therefore, in
some respects, a hybrid administrative body. He states:
EABs give these appellants a chance to take a case to an independent
appeal board that commands the stature and dignity commensurate with a
quasi-judicial proceeding. In addition, EABs allow for a broad range of
technical and scientific input and give all affected parties the right to be
heard. Through the EAB process, appellants have the opportunity to
question key policies and decisions affecting their environment and,
ultimately, to increase the accountability of departmental officials by
having their decisions reviewed by a Board comprised of administrative
law judges. Moreover, EABs are quasi-judicial, which means hearings,
when they are necessary, can be structured to handle the people, policies
and issues raised by the appeal.3'
Appendix I lists the key Canadian environmental tribunals, listing the
broad functions they fulfill, and offering a concise view of both similari-
ties and differences. In our view, while the differences need to be taken
into account, the similarities in the way the three general modes of
administrative responsibility are assigned and executed justify the need
for the model law presented at the end of this paper.
II. The Use of ADR Techniques by Canadian Administrative Tribunals
ADR techniques have been used in the environmental administrative
field by the federal government and by at least six tribunals in five
provinces. At present, they are employed under the Canadian Environ-
mental Assessment Act, and by the Alberta EAB, the Manitoba Clean
Environment Commission, the Ontario Environmental Assessment and
Appeal Board, the Ontario Energy Board, the Quebec Bureau d'audiences
publiques sur l'environnement (BAPE), and the Nova Scotia Environ-
mental Assessment Board. The nature of these activities varies consider-
ably from one tribunal to another. They are summarized in Appendix II
and will be addressed in more detail below.
There appears to be a consensus among tribunal members that ADR
processes are more efficient than formal hearings and can result in
considerable cost and time savings.32 This is particularly the case with
respect to environmental assessment hearings, which are often lengthy
and involve a multiplicity of parties. In addition, tribunal members
indicated to us that a further benefit of ADR is that it gives the parties more
31. "Environmental Appeal Boards," supra note 4 at 3.
32. Interviews with board members conducted by the authors, spring 1998.
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input into final decisions, and thereby increases the legitimacy of the final
outcome. Many of the tribunals in question, we should note, are either in
the process of developing detailed ADR guidelines (such as Nova Scotia)
or have only recently implemented such guidelines (such as the federal
government, Alberta and Ontario).
In the discussion that follows, we will address the principal questions
raised during our interviews and provide recommendations with respect
to the "best practices" that environmental tribunals in Canada should
follow if they intend to incorporate mediation into their administrations.
Our advice draws on our experience with ADR in the U.S. as well as in
Canada.
1. Who Should Mediate?
There is a great deal of variation in the Canadian environmental admin-
istrative context with respect to the appointment of mediators. At one end
of the spectrum, the National Energy Board has adopted a policy of
prohibiting Board members from conducting mediations or settlement
conferences. Part II of its Rules of Practice states explicitly that "no
member or employee of the Board will participate in any mediation
process involving the applicant and parties or potential parties to a
regulatory proceeding." The most the Board can do is to advise the parties
that they may retain an independent mediator if they so choose."
At the other end of the spectrum, there are some administrative bodies
that have explicit statutory responsibility to conduct mediation them-
selves. The best example is the BAPE, which is empowered under section
6.3 of the Environmental Quality Act 14 to conduct inquiries and hold
public hearings. Pursuant to its Rules of Procedure, it may appoint one of
its members as mediator prior to a full public hearing. In direct contrast
to the National Energy Board, the parties to a mediation before the BAPE
are not permitted to retain their own mediator and must follow the
detailed rules set forth in the BAPE Rules of Procedure." Other jurisdic-
tions have policies that fall somewhere in between. For example, as with
the BAPE, the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board's Rules of Practice
33. The Board does maintain a list of recommended mediators, but the parties are not bound
to use the list and may select their own mediator.
34. R.S.Q., c. Q-2.
35. The BAPE has adopted explicit Rules of Procedure relating to the conduct of environmen-
tal mediation (the "R~gles de procedure relatives au d6roulement des mediations" (1995)). All
BAPE commissioners are under oath and bound by the BAPE Code of Ethics. The Code
stipulates that each Commissioner must avoid conflicts of interest, act with impartiality,
encourage the public to express their opinions openly and foster mutual respect among the
participants.
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contemplate a pre-hearing facilitation process conducted by the Board.3 6
These rules give the Board the discretion either to conduct the mediation
itself or to appoint a neutral party. Finally, some jurisdictions have
adopted appointment procedures which can best be described as ad hoc.
For example, in Manitoba, the Environment Act empowers the Minister
to appoint an environmental mediator at their discretion.37 There are no
explicit Rules of Practice specifying the procedure for making such
appointments or listing the sources of possible mediators, and the
Minister has never used this discretion to formally appoint a mediator.
However, the Clean Environment Commission, which has the jurisdic-
tion to hold public hearings concerning environmental licensing and
assessments, often conducts mediations on an informal basis.3"
Although the approach to the appointment of mediators adopted in
each jurisdiction must relate, in part, to the particular circumstances and
legislative mandates in each case, there are three general concerns that
inform these respective choices. These concerns are: (a) how should the
public interest be included and protected? (b) how can the participants be
assured that mediations are conducted by "qualified" practitioners? and,
(c) how can the participants be assured that mediation is, in some way,
"sheltered" during whatever formal proceedings may follow, if the
parties fail to reach a settlement?
36. Where the parties to an appeal have been determined, the Rules of Practice stipulate that
the Board may, on its own initiative or at the request of the parties, schedule one or more pre-
hearing meetings prior to the date set for the appeal. The purpose of the pre-hearing meeting,
according to the Rules of Practice, is "to facilitate the resolution of the appeal or to determine
any of the procedural matters". The Board members have mediation training and, where
possible, will attempt to facilitate a resolution of the appeal at the pre-hedring meeting.
Alternatively, if it appears that it would be productive, the Board may adjourn its hearing for
a reasonable time to allow for professional mediation. The Ontario Environmental Assessment
and Appeal and the Ontario Energy Board have adopted the same approach. Under their
respective Rules of Practice, settlement conferences are conducted by persons who are
members of the Board, but not on the panel, or by another person appointed by the Board.
37. In Manitoba, the Minister has permissive authority to appoint a mediator under section
3 of the Environment Act, S.M. 1987-88, c. 26, which states:
3(3) The minister may, where the minister deems it advisable, and where the conflicting parties
concur, appoint an environmental mediator acceptable to the parties to mediate between person
involved in an environmental conflict, and the mediator so appointed shall, within six weeks
after completion of the mediation, report to the minister the results of the mediation.
In Nova Scotia, the Minister has a similar discretion under section 14 of the Environment Act,
S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 1, and it is generally the Environmental Assessment Board that conducts the
mediations on the Minister's behalf.
38. A Clean Environment Commission interviewee stated in an interview that, although the
organization has no formal mandate to conduct mediation, the Minister often entrusts the Clean
Environment Commission with the responsibility for conducting mediations where there is a
lack of consensus concerning a licensing question, as part of its broader mandate to conduct
public hearings. The mediations are conducted on an ad hoc basis, and may involve simply
working through process concerns with the parties prior to the hearing or sending the parties
off to caucus concerning individual issues.
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a. Protecting the Public Interest
In most ADR contexts, mediator neutrality is emphasized as a central
element of ADR practice. It is well accepted that, to properly facilitate
negotiations between parties to a dispute, a mediator must be neutral.3 9
As Susskind and Weinstein explain it:
The perception of the mediator's neutrality is critical-it allows a bond of
trust to develop between the mediator and the parties involved. This bond
of trust enables the mediator to receive confidential messages from the
stakeholders; these in turn, provide clues about the direction that bargain-
ing must take in order to achieve a settlement.40
According to Hamilton, there are two essential characteristics of media-
tor neutrality.4 First, the mediator must be independent of all parties to
the dispute, including interested government agencies. Second, the
mediator must have no authority to impose a settlement or a particular
version of disputed facts on the parties. As Susskind and Weinstein state:
The mediator operates without the benefit of any higher authority that can
force the parties to keep meeting or that can impose sanctions on one of the
parties if agreements are breached.42
While there is little debate that mediator impartiality is critical to
encouraging settlement, particularly in terms of giving the parties the
ultimate control over the substantive outcome, the problem in an environ-
mental context is that such neutrality may come into direct conflict with
the requirements of environmental protection and the public interest
mandate of many of the administrative agencies involved. Indeed, it is
very likely that a public interest mandate can interfere with an agency's
ability to act as a true "neutral" because many agencies have a specific
mandate to ensure that a mediated settlement adequately protects the
environment. Where a particular compromise might involve the infringe-
39. Feerick, for example, has observed that the concept of mediator impartiality is "central
to the mediation process"; J. Feerick, "Toward Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators"
(1997) 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455 at 461. Indeed, the idea of impartiality seems to form part of the
very definition of mediation as a "consensual process in which a neutral third party, without
any power to impose a resolution, works with the disputing parties to help them reach a
mutually acceptable resolution of some or all of the issues in dispute." J. Folberg & A. Taylor,
Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1984) at 7-8. See also K. Liepmann "Confidentiality in Environmental Media-
tion: Should Independent Professionals Have Access to the Process?" (1986) 14 B.C. Env. Aff.
L.J. 93 at 98 [hereinafter "Confidentiality"].
40. L. Susskind & A. Weinstein, "Towards a Theory of Environmental Mediation" (1980-81)
9 Boston Coll. Env. Affairs L. Rev. 311 at 347 [hereinafter "Towards a Theory"].
41. M. Hamilton, "Environmental Mediation: Requirements for Successful Institutionaliza-
tion" in M. Mills, ed., Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector (Chicago: Nelson-
Hall Publisher, 1991) 164 at 170-171.
42. "Towards a Theory," supra note 40 at 347.
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ment of a statutory standard, where it might harm parties not repre-
sented,43 or where it might set an inappropriate precedent for future
decisions, the relevant agency must intervene." As noted by Susskind:
Environmental mediators ought to be concerned about: 1) the impacts of
negotiated agreements on underrepresented or unrepresentable groups in
the community; 2) the possibility that joint net gains have not been
maximized; 3) the long-term or spillover effects of the settlements they
help to reach; and 4) the precedents that they set and the precedents upon
which agreements are based.... Environmental mediators should also be
concerned that the agreements they help to reach are just and stable.45
Of course, as Hamilton notes, each modification of the mediator's role
proposed by Susskind undercuts the mediator's non-partisanship. In fact,
requiring a mediator to accept more responsibility for protecting the
public interest can have the effect of converting mediation to a process
closer to arbitration. 6 Thus, what should mediators in tribunal processes
do or, for that matter, not do?
A good example of this problem can be found in the Guidelines for
Board-Appointed Facilitators and Mediators promulgated by the Ontario
Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board.47 On the one hand, the
Guidelines state that the mandate of the mediator includes "assisting the
parties in an impartial manner to conduct constructive negotiations and
pursue creative problem-solving." On the other hand, the Guidelines go
on to state that:
To the extent that it is imperative that the Board's adjudicative role not be
compromised by the appointment of a mediator, the guidelines may
represent a departure from mediation principles.
In effect, the Guidelines require the mediator to ensure that "negotiations
and agreements reflect the primary importance of environmental conser-
vation and protection" and "inform the parties of pertinent Board policy"
and "identify relevant environmental information or other concerns
which have not been addressed or adequately resolved by the parties." It
is apparent in this context that the mediator's neutrality at the Ontario
43. J. Blackburn, "Environmental Mediation as an Alternative to Litigation: The Emerging
Practice and Limitations" in Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector, supra note 40,
123 at 126.
44. See generally R. Baruch Bush, "Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation" (1989) 41 U. Fla. L.
Rev. 253 at 260; and L. Susskind, "Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem"
(1981) 6 Vermont L. Rev. 1 at 42-47 [hereinafter "Environmental Mediation"].
45. "Environmental Mediation," ibid. at 46-47.
46. J. Stulberg, "The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind"
(1981) 6 Vermont L. Rev. 85 at 107-112.
47. On file with author.
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Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board could be compromised.
The mediator working in this setting does not have a mandate merely to
encourage the parties to reach an agreement that satisfies their interests.
Instead, the mediator's neutrality is limited by his or her mandate to help
the parties reach an agreement which, in addition, satisfies the goals of
environmental protection, Board policies and the public interest. Where
the mediator's mandate comes into conflict with the interests of some of
the parties, it is apparent that the interests of the parties do not always take
precedence over the mediator's institutional interests.
The environmental mediator's dual role, as illustrated by the above
Guidelines, raises a difficult challenge. There is no question that many
tribunals want to, and should, encourage a greater number of environ-
mental settlements through mediation. Voluntary settlements permit
tribunals to reduce costs,48 make more efficient use of their time, and find
solutions that may better satisfy the needs of the parties involved. On the
other hand, there is a risk that, by relying on mediation, tribunal members
will undercut their role as guardians of the public interest. This very
concern was of primary importance in the National Energy Board's
decision not to conduct its own mediations. Indeed, one Board inter-
viewee reported that the key reason the Board does not conduct media-
tions is that it does not want to compromise its statutory obligation as a
public guardian of the environment. 49 In other words, members of the
National Energy Board do not believe they can be both neutral mediators
and effective Board members.
How, then, should administrative bodies strike a balance between the
need for mediators to be impartial and the need for tribunal-sponsored
proceedings to adequately protect the public interest? In our view, the
answer to this question depends on: (1) whether the tribunal has a specific
public interest mandate; (2) whether the public is adequately represented
at the table as one of the parties; (3) whether the Board is expected to act
as a final decision-maker, a quasi-judicial body, or a public inquirer; and,
(4) whether the Board's authority is likely to be compromised by taking
on mediating functions.
48. Although this has certainly not been the primary motivation in the Canadian environmen-
tal administrative context, there is no question that efficiency considerations have come into
play in the design of ADR programs. For example, in an average public inquiry, the BAPE will
spend $250,000 on its costs alone (not taking into account the costs of the parties). A successful
mediation, by contrast, will cost a fraction of that price, and will achieve a satisfactory result
for the parties involved.
49. Interviews with board members conducted by the authors, spring 1998.
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If a tribunal has a specific public interest mandate, then ADR tech-
niques must be used in a way that ensures this mandate is met. How it is
met can vary depending on the Board's structure and responsibilities. For
instance, if all the various representatives of stakeholding priorities are
already at the table, then the "public interest" is more likely to be served.
This suggests that one of the most important ways that a tribunal can
ensure that the public interest is met in a mediation is to work very hard
at the outset to bring appropriate representation of all stakeholder groups
to the table. This might entail going well beyond merely publicizing the
fact that mediation is about to proceed, to making explicit efforts (through
Board staff) to reach out to public interest groups and invite them to
become involved. Boards may also want to consider less formal and more
inclusive rules of standing, if possible, for participation in mediation
versus more formal processes.
In an environmental appeal in Alberta, a lawyer from the Justice
Department represents the Department of Environment in any mediation.
If an emerging agreement appears to be headed beyond the bounds of the
law or the Ministry's sense of the public interest, then it would be
incumbent upon, and in the interest of, the Justice disputant to oppose it.
In that case, the burden of defining the public interest is at least somewhat
removed from the tribunal. It is not the mediator who ensures that the
public interest is served, but rather the relevant parties. The tribunal can
worry more about the relative merits of the claims of all the groups
involved and the extent to which the mediator has proceeded in a fair
manner.
If representatives of various stakeholding publics are not at the table,
the mandate of the tribunal and the other participants diverge signifi-
cantly, and/or the Board has some "oversight" responsibility for the
broader public interest, then representation "at the table" is not sufficient.
What then?
We suggest that tribunal board members can, under the right condi-
tions, shift from a purely mediative role to a quasi-judicial, albeit
narrowly constrained, role. The line where the two meet is not bright in
practice and does not have to be as long as certain constraints are
respected. During the settlement conference in which a tribunal member
mediates, the member will play a mediative role and should remain
"utterly" non-partisan toward the outcome. Later in the mediation,
however, if the mediation has reached an impasse, or appears to be
moving toward an agreement that the tribunal is highly unlikely to accept
due to its public interest mandate, then the tribunal mediator has a
responsibility to intervene beyond what is typically required by an
independent and purely facilitative mediator.
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If the parties have reached an impasse because one party is holding out
for an agreement that the tribunal member knows is highly unlikely to be
agreed to by the tribunal, the mediator may choose to step out of the
mediative role to inform the parties of the likely limits on any agreement
that may be presented before the formally convened tribunal. If one party
clearly and substantially lacks sufficient technical advice to make in-
formed decisions, then the mediator may choose to request that the parties
obtain that advice, stepping out of his or her mediative role. If the parties
have agreed that no agreement appears likely, the mediator may move
into the quasi-judicial role of helping the parties narrow and refine the
issues to be brought before the tribunal in a formal hearing (or might refer
the parties to a pre-hearing conference conducted by one or more
members of the formal panel to narrow or "scope" the issues).
However, when a tribunal member steps outside of the mediative role,
several limiting conditions must necessarily be met: (1) the parties must
be informed that the tribunal member as mediator may step out of the
mediative role, and under what conditions, before mediation begins; (2)
the tribunal member must remain true to the rules of confidentiality
(nothing said in mediation that goes beyond that required in formal
discovery processes, such as settlement offers, will be used in later formal
proceedings and the mediator is bound to not pass on information
revealed in meditation to the tribunal, formally or informally); (3) the
tribunal member must not later serve as a formal panel member5° ; (4) the
mediator must be clear when he or she is moving out of the impartial role
to provide substantive advice to the parties; (5) that advice must be clearly
stated as non-binding advice which does not preclude the parties from
terminating the mediation and going before the tribunal in formal
proceedings; (6) the mediator should work with the parties in a non-
partisan matter to flesh out all issues and interests, explore options for
settlement, and seek agreement first, with good faith and fair effort,
before moving into a quasi-judicial role; and, (7) the mediator should be
protected from acting as final arbiter of an agreement by being able to
withdraw from the mediation if necessary, and by having the tribunal (or
the Minister) review agreements after they are reached in mediation.
The decision-making authority of the tribunal should also influence
whether or not its members mediate. When the tribunal serves primarily
as a final decision-maker (the National Energy Board, for example), and
50. For instance, in the case of the EAB, the Board member who participated as the mediator
in a case is not allowed to sit on a subsequent merits hearing.
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not as an arbiter or fact finder, then members should probably not
mediate. In its decision-making role, the tribunal is functioning the way
that an environmental agency does when it promulgates rules and
regulations and makes decisions regarding compliance. As statutorily
appointed decision-makers, tribunal members cannot fulfill their respon-
sibility as "neutrals" and ensure that all statutes and regulations are
properly met.
When a tribunal serves more in a quasi-judicial capacity (an appeal
board, for example), there is probably less concern about Board members
mediating. Since an appeal board's mandate is mostly to settle disputes
rather than render project or policy decisions (a decision by the Ministry
of Environment has already been made, and it has been appealed to the
board), then mediation in the form of a settlement conference with a board
member involved is well within the board's mandate. When tribunals act
in a fact-finding or policy recommending role (such as the BAPE or many
assessment boards), taking on the roll of neutral coincides with their
public interest responsibilities because part of their mandate is to encour-
age public dialogue, uncover all relevant technical facts, and investigate
all views. In a broad sense, such boards are already playing a mediating
role whether or not they formally adopt mediation procedures. Lastly, a
board must consider whether its authority could be compromised if it
takes on both decision-making and mediating functions. By stepping "off
the bench," some tribunals worry that their overall authority may be
impaired. Some members cannot see themselves sitting down, side-by-
side with the parties, giving up the trappings of full-scale board review.
From our standpoint, this is primarily a question of perceptions. In
some cultures and contexts, the board's overall reputation could well be
hurt by adopting the informality of mediation some of the time. In other
settings, the parties are likely to be indifferent or even oblivious to the
board's multiple roles as long as the board is clear about when it is acting
in which role, and what the rules of the game are. For example, if a board
member is mediating, he or she must be clear that they are not serving in
a decision-making capacity. A particular tribunal member may make this
distinction clear by holding mediation sessions outside the formal hear-
ing room and wearing more informal clothing.51 If a board member is
serving in a decision-making or arbitrating role, then it must be clear that
they are operating under more constrained evidentiary rules and proto-
cols.
51. For instance, in the case of the Alberta EAB, mediations are typically conducted in small
boardrooms while formal hearings are often held in provincial or federal courtrooms.
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We also want to offer a counter-intuitive argument. It may be that a
board's authority and stature enhance its effectiveness as a mediator and
thus, the respect it wins from the public-at-large. A board member's
stature could suggest to disputants that mediation is board-supported and
ought to be taken seriously. In addition, as discussed above, since a board
member holds extensive experience in the workings of the board, they
may actually better be able to serve the disputants. They can remind the
parties, when necessary, of any public interests mandated by the board,
help to ensure fairness if one or more parties lacks minimum technical
support, and remind the parties, if necessary, of the bounds of agreement
seeking as constrained by the board. One should view this argument with
a degree of caution, however. If exercised with too much direction and
authority in mediation, a board member's authority could, in fact,
substantially hinder mediation. If the tribunal mediator acts primarily as
a judge or behaves in a "judge-like" fashion, that could add inappropri-
ately to the formality of the proceedings, hinder the free flow of conver-
sation necessary to reach agreement, and restrict the principle of self-
determination.
b. Ensuring Qualified Mediators
Whether board members or others mediate, it is incumbent upon boards
utilizing mediation that their mediators be properly skilled. Mediation
capabilities can broadly be classified in terms of process skills and
substantive knowledge of the issue(s) in dispute. Thus, an outside
mediator with a great deal of experience may bring a superior set of
"process" skills to the mediation. Board members, generally appointed
for their technical or legal expertise, may lack these skills. On the other
hand, an outside mediator may know little or nothing about the legal
context or the technical issues before the tribunal and may lack a fully
developed understanding of the board's mandate to protect the public
interest and what this means in practice. Thus, in the long run, tribunal
members may be far better placed to conduct mediations because of their
"substantive" knowledge. Tribunal members with the requisite environ-
mental expertise are often well-acquainted with the parties and the
interests involved in disputes that come before them.52 In addition, as a
BAPE interviewee observed, the problem with appointing outside media-
tors is that they are not trained in the specific mandate of the administra-
52. An interviewee from the Ontario Energy Board stated that the Board has found the
mediator appointment process to be difficult. On the one hand, they want to appoint someone
with substantive knowledge of the field. On the other hand, they want to appoint an experienced
mediator. Often, it is difficult to find persons who satisfy both criteria and are not themselves
board members.
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tive agency in question. The same interviewee observed that there is a
greater risk that outside mediators will place their own mandate (i.e.,
achieving a settlement or enhancing their own reputation) ahead of the
tribunal's interest.5 3 In short, administrative tribunals must weigh each
advantage and disadvantage of relying on internal versus external media-
tors in setting standards of practice.
Whoever mediates, all tribunals are faced with the challenge of
ensuring quality mediation. If outside mediators are used, the tribunal
might develop a screening program for prospective mediators to ensure
they have the requisite training, experience, and expertise. Indeed, a
board might offer the appropriate training in the substance of its disputes
(i.e., legal and technical issues) to potential outside mediators and only
choose those who perform acceptably. If board members decide to
mediate themselves, the board should consider providing on-going
process training to build and enhance the skills of its members.54 There
is no correlation between effectiveness as a regulator, or litigator, orjudge
and the skills of mediation. These must be learned. In addition, board
members must be trained to help clearly distinguish, and move between,
their role as a mediator without decision-making authority and as a
tribunal member with decision-making powers. Ultimately, each board
must develop a thoughtful process for selecting and training mediators.
c. Sheltering Mediation from Formal Tribunal Proceedings
Boards must always ensure that they protect the neutrality of the media-
tion process. This means, at the very least, that if a board member
mediates, he or she will not subsequently sit on the panel that hears the
case if it is not settled. For example, the board members of the Alberta
Environmental Appeal Board mediate cases. However, if the parties fail
to settle, the case goes before the full, formal Board (three of its total of
eight members), without the individual member who served as mediator.
It may be tempting to the board members hearing the case, if it fails to
reach settlement in mediation, to "quiz" the mediator on what happened.
That, however, would be wholly inappropriate. If the parties suspect that
53. An interviewee from the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board made a similar observa-
tion. The interviewee observed that the Board has been reluctant to appoint outside mediators
because the Board is concerned that they will not adequately protect the public interest (i.e.,
there is too much of a perceived danger of dealmaking behind closed doors and "horse
trading"). The Board also feels that it needs to keep abreast of the process. However, if outside
mediators could be properly trained concerning the purposes and role of the Board, it is possible
that they could be used in the future, due to the ever-increasing workload of the Board.
54. Given that many boards are appointed by Cabinets, they are not necessarily long-term
appointments. Thus, on-going training, especially for new members, is essential.
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the mediator will also play an evaluative role if settlement negotiations
break down, they will not be able to share certain information and rely on
the neutral in ways that they should. Confidentiality, trust, and the parties'
knowledge that their mediator will not be their arbitrator are key to the
effectiveness of any mediator.
2. What Role Should Tribunal Members Play During Case In-Take?
At present, there are three different approaches used by Canadian
environmental tribunals at the case in-take stage: the pre-hearing confer-
ence, the settlement conference, and proceeding directly to a formal
hearing.
The technique most commonly employed is the pre-hearing confer-
ence, the purpose of which is either to facilitate the negotiated resolution
of a dispute (or one or more issues forming part of the dispute) or to clarify
procedural matters prior to the hearing (e.g., narrow or "scope" the issues
to be addressed, ascertain which parties have standing and must be
present at the hearing, set timetables, and clarify which materials must be
submitted at the hearing). Pre-hearing conferences are employed by the
Alberta EAB, 55 the Manitoba Clean Environment Commission,5 6 and the
55. The Alberta EAB's Rules of Practice state that "the purpose of a pre-hearing meeting is
to facilitate the resolution of the appeal or to determine... procedural matters.... Parties shall
come to the pre-hearing fully prepared for a useful discussion of all issues involved in the
appeal, both procedural and substantive, and authorized to negotiate and make decisions with
respect thereto."
In addition the Rules of Practice state that "one purpose of a pre-hearing is to facilitate the
resolution of the appeal." The Rules contemplate mediation during the pre-hearing by either
a Board member of a third party. Where an agreement is reached, the Board must prepare a
report and recommendations, signed by the parties, to be submitted to the Minister. Where the
parties do not reach a resolution, the EAB may nonetheless address the following issues at the
pre-hearing, among others: determine any matter of procedure, determine the issues for the
hearing, set a schedule, admit facts or evidence, have the parties exchange submissions,
determine the day-to-day conduct of the hearing.
56. An interviewee from the Clean Environment Commission, which has a mandate to
conduct environmental assessment public hearings under the Environment Act, stated that the
mediations conducted by the Commission are informal, although the legislation provides for
mediation in the formal sense. Often, mediation forms one part of the more extensive public
hearing process. At the outset of the hearing, the Commission will get the parties together and
try to work through as many process concerns as possible, and to focus the issues. This will
often involve something as simple as asking two people in a public hearing to go off together,
have coffee and resolve particular issues.
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Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board. 57 Generally, pre-
hearing conferences are conducted by members of the tribunal who form
part of the panel designated to hear the dispute. These conferences are
analogous to the pre-trial conferences held by judges in civil cases.
Although tribunal members sometimes employ mediation techniques
during these pre-hearing conferences, the conferences are not held
strictly for the purposes of settlement, and ADR methods are employed
on an ad hoc basis.
A second technique is to hold formal settlement conferences where
mediation is employed as a first step prior to a hearing. At present, formal
mediation is one of the significant options used under the Canadian
57. Recently, the Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board has introduced two types of
ADR techniques under their Rules of Practice: the "preliminary hearing" and the "settlement
conference." A preliminary hearing is considered to be part of the formal hearing process (but
at which evidence is not taken) and is conducted in public by a Board member who may or may
not be a member of the panel hearing the evidence. Participation in the hearing may be required
by the Board. Its purpose is to identify the parties and witnesses, identify, simplify and scope
issues, establish agreed facts, set a schedule for the hearing and deal with preliminary motions,
among other things. By contrast, a settlement conference, which is held for the purpose of
simplification or settlement of issues, is not part of the hearing and is conducted by a member
of the Board who is not on the panel conducting the hearing or by another person appointed by
the Board. The settlement conference requires the consent of all the participating parties, and
is held in private. All documents submitted and all statements made at the settlement
conference are confidential and without prejudice and will not be communicated at any time
by the mediator to non-parties, the public or the panel except with consent of the parties.
Confidential documents are not accessible by the public and do not form part of the record. The
Boards have drawn up extensive "Guidelines for Board-Appointed Facilitators and Mediators"
as a means to standardize the process.
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EnvironmentalAssessmentAct, 8 and by the Quebec BAPE, 9 the Ontario
58. As explained by Saxe, "Environmental ADR," supra note 10 at 4278-81, the CEAA
provides two main options for resolving disputes which arise in the course of environmental
assessments: (1) mediation and (2) public hearings before a review panel. The responsible
authority may ask the Minister of the Environment to refer all, or part, of any environmental
assessment disputes to a mediator, if the proposed project could cause significant adverse
effects on the environment. The Minister may also refer a dispute to mediation on his or her
own initiative. The mediation proceeds as follows. Once the decision to conduct a mediation
has been made, all "interested parties" (i.e., any person having an interest in the outcome of the
assessment for a purpose that is neither frivolous nor vexatious), must be identified. The
Minister appoints the mediator after consultation with the proponent, the relevant provincial
government and the interested parties. The mediator must be "unbiased and free from any
conflict of interest" and must have "knowledge or experience in acting as a mediator." The
Minister also fixes the terms of reference of the mediation. Anything said by the mediator or
an interested party during the mediation is privileged, although not necessarily confidential. At
the conclusion of the mediation, the mediator must submit a report to the Minister and the
responsible authority. The responsible authority makes the final decision, but has the obliga-
tion to consider, and if the federal cabinet approves, respond to the mediator's report. If the
mediation fails to resolve the dispute and the matter goes to a full public hearing, the remaining
unresolved issues will be determined without reference to the mediation.
59. As an alternative to the public hearing process, BAPE will mediate an environmental
assessment in lieu of a public hearing. Mediation before the BAPE is a voluntary process and
the parties retain their right during that process to request a full public heaing. Instead of the
four-month period required for a public hearing, the mediation process takes place over a 2-
month period. If the mediation results in an agreement, the agreement is submitted by the BAPE
to the Minister and, if approved, becomes a full part of the permit issued by the Minister.
As noted by Saxe, "Environmental ADR," supra note 10 at 4289-90, the BAPE's mediations
have five main stages:
I. The Ministerof the Environment instructs BAPE to attempt mediation. This is announced
by press release.
2. BAPE meets separately with the proponent and the objectors to explain its role and the
procedure for the mediation. During this phase, the parties decide whether the transcript
will be made public immediately, or only when the mediation is concluded. BAPE also
discusses the issues with each party and each side's position. The mediation will not
proceed unless the objectors agree that the project is justified, and wish only to have its
implementation modified. However, BAPE may proceed with a mediation even if some
parties refuse to participate.
3. BAPE meets with the parties together and attempts to bring about agreement. The role of
the mediator is to encourage information exchange and the generation of new options. The
mediator may also terminate the mediation at any time. Transcripts are kept of all
meetings.
4. If an agreement is reached, the proponent confirms its commitments in writing to all
parties and to the Minister (the approving authority). The objectors then withdraw their
request for a public hearing.
5. BAPE makes a public report to the Minister on the progress of the mediation and all
transcripts and documents from the mediation are now made available to the public, if
disclosure was deferred earlier.
If the mediation does not result in an agreement, or if the BAPE decides that the mediated
agreement does not adequately protect the environment, BAPE reports to the Minister that a
public hearing should take place. The mediation transcripts are made public during the hearing,
but cannot be used as evidence.
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Energy Board, the Nova Scotia Environmental Assessment Board, 60 and
the Alberta EAB.61 These processes provide for the appointment of either
a board member as mediator or an independent mediator, and are
generally not conducted by the tribunal members designated to sit at the
subsequent hearing. In contrast to pre-hearing conferences, which are
designed to facilitate decision-making in the formal hearing, the above
processes are designed primarily to prevent a full formal hearing, and
instead to reach an acceptable settlement among the parties. Finally, some
tribunals do not employ pre-hearing or intake conferences at all. Two
examples are the British Columbia Environmental Appeal Board and the
National Energy Board. Cases proceed directly to the formal administra-
tive processes.
If a Board chooses to use a more formalized ADR process, such as
mediation-prior to a full scale hearing-we recommend an intervention
even prior to the mediated settlement conference. We recommend under-
taking what is called a conflict assessment at the earliest stages of case
intake. Our discussions with tribunal members, as well as our experience
as mediators, strongly indicate that a conflict assessment can dramati-
cally increase the chances of settlement.
A conflict assessment is typically carried out via phone or in-person
interviews with each of the parties prior to mediation or a settlement
conference. In the conflict assessment, the person undertaking it helps
each stakeholder group: (1) understand what mediation is; (2) clarify its
interest, and the likely costs associated with trying to reach a settlement;
(3) formulate the agenda of issues that will need to be considered at a pre-
conference hearing or in a more extended mediation; (4) review ground
rules that would apply in any ad hoc settlement effort; (5) consider
whether there are other parties (including technical experts) who should
be involved in some way; and (6) think through the steps involved in
mediation and what it would take to prepare adequately for a settlement
effort.
60. Under the new EnvironmentAct, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 1 provision is expressly made for the
use of "alternative dispute resolution" in any environmental dispute (s. 14). To date, alternative
dispute resolution is used principally in the environmental assessment context. Under the Act,
once a proponent for a project has registered the project with the Minister and published a notice
of the undertaking, the Minister has the discretion, under section 14 of the Act, to refer the
undertaking to "alternative dispute resolution" (the provisions of the Act for alternative dispute
resolution are mirrored in the Environmental Assessment Regulations and the Environmental
Assessment Board Regulations, Regs. 26/95, 27/95). Where the Minister decides to use ADR,
the Minister, in consultation with the affected parties, decides which forum is most appropriate.
Generally it is the Nova Scotia Environmental Assessment Board that conducts the alternative
dispute resolution process.
61. The Environmental Appeal Board Regulation explicitly allows for mediation under
A.25.6:1 1.
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The first objective of the conflict assessment-explaining the ADR
process-is often neglected. One Ontario Environmental Assessment
and Appeal Board interviewee observed that many parties who appear
before administrative tribunals are private citizens who have no experi-
ence with formal board hearings and do not understand the process. An
interviewee from the Nova Scotia Environmental Assessment Board
reiterated this point and observed that, although ADR is often beneficial
for individual citizens because it allows for more meaningful and direct
input into the process, when the public does not understand the ADR
process they often assume that it is "simply more bureaucratic decision-
making." Or, if the parties do not understand the process but participate
anyway, they may waste the opportunity because they are unprepared. It
is important for each tribunal to educate the parties about the process it
proposes to use by explaining: (1) the differences between mediation and
a regular hearing; (2) the advantages of mediation (including reduced
costs and time commitment for the parties involved and a stronger
likelihood that they will be "heard"); (3) that the parties have not and do
not forgo their right to a full formal board hearing in the event the parties
cannot reach agreement; (4) the role the board member will play in
mediation, if any; and, (5) confidentiality rules surrounding mediation.
The parties should understand, before they commence mediation, exactly
what they are getting into. 62 Conflict assessment provides this important
educational opportunity prior to participation.
A conflict assessment also allows a tribunal to properly determine
which parties should be involved in mediation. If there is a key party
missing from an upcoming mediation, the conflict assessment can be a
means of ascertaining that others should be brought in. On the other hand,
through assessment and discussion, some parties may find that they are
comfortable with others representing them, or, once they have a better
understanding of what is at stake, they may feel that it is not worth it to
them to commit the time and resources required to participate.
While mediation allows for a more flexible and ad hoc approach to
questions of standing, it is not yet clear whether board members should
seek to narrow the number of parties as much as possible or to be as
inclusive as possible. Certainly, as noted earlier, it may be necessary to
add parties to ensure that the public interest is adequately addressed.
Some tribunal members believe that when there are too many parties
62. It should be noted that some boards do an equally dismal job of explaining precisely how
the formal administrative process works and what is expected of the parties in those processes.
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involved, it is very difficult to reach a successful result. The BAPE, for
example, rarely attempts mediation with more than five parties. There
are, however, professional mediators used to working with much larger
numbers of parties and who believe that increasing the array of stakehold-
ers involved in mediation can enhance, rather than hinder, the prospects
for agreement. 63
A conflict assessment can also be an opportunity for a tribunal to
narrow the range of issues that need to be addressed, clarify the interests
and concerns of the parties, and with this information in hand, develop a
focused agenda and ground rules that will improve the efficiency of the
face-to-face mediation once it is underway. The conflict assessment is
also a time for the tribunal to build trust and credibility with the parties,
and to assure the parties that their concerns have been heard by the
tribunal. While a more personal relationship between a tribunal member
and the parties in a formal proceeding is not only unnecessary but
probably inappropriate, in mediation, developing one-on-one rapport can
be essential. The conflict assessment provides an opportunity to develop
this rapport.
Assessment prior to mediation or settlement conferences can also help
a tribunal determine if a case is appropriate for mediation. There is a
growing consensus among tribunal members that mediation techniques
work best when fundamental issues of principle are not at stake. Where
fundamental disagreements concerning "rights" are involved and it is
apparent that a settlement will not be reached, a great deal of unnecessary
time and expense can be saved. For example, the Quebec BAPE will only
proceed with a mediation if there is agreement that the project in question
should proceed (i.e., they have found that mediation works best when it
addresses methods for implementing a project in an environmentally and
community-friendly manner, as opposed to addressing the more deeply-
rooted matter of community opposition to the project). Furthermore, even
if fundamental principles are not at stake, an assessment may reveal that
one or more parties is so entrenched in her or his position and viewpoint
that mediation is likely to lead to more, not less, frustration and
discontent.
A conflict assessment, as part of a tribunal's intake process, should
preferably be conducted one-on-one. Parties are more likely to speak
candidly and the tribunal can ask more detailed and probing questions
when all parties are not present. Many mediators prefer to do these
63. See L. Susskind & J. Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse (New York: Basic Books, 1987)
[hereinafter Breaking the Impasse].
80 The Dalhousie Law Journal
interviews themselves as a way of establishing rapport with parties whom
they may later serve. However, it is possible that a well-trained tribunal
staff member could conduct all conflict assessment interviews because
the staff person could develop specialized skills at doing this over time,
bring consistency across cases, and relieve Board members of the time
commitment involved in undertaking such interviews.'
Some boards may think that undertaking a conflict assessment as part
of intake violates ex parte communication rules. If this is the case, then
the pre-mediation discussion may have to take place with all the parties
present (either in-person or via teleconference). Or, to further avoid any
discomfort with such pre-settlement conversations and to avoid the
perception of any "back room" dealing, the Board should be clear about
the purpose of these interviews and request the consent of all parties
before conducting pre-settlement confidential conferences. Or, the tribu-
nal may enlist a staff member or an outside mediator, rather than an
administrative tribunal member, to prepare the conflict assessment inter-
views.
3. How Should Tribunals Handle Complex Technical and Scientific
Issues within the Context of Settlement Negotiations?
Environmental mediators are often asked to handle cases which raise
complex technical and scientific issues. In many of these situations, the
parties will be sophisticated enough to handle these issues, or to ensure
that the necessary experts are retained. However, in some cases, no such
expertise is available either through the parties or through outside
assistance. This is a particular problem when average citizens are in-
volved because many of them have insufficient technical or scientific
knowledge, and lack access to qualified experts. For example, appeals to
issuance of reclamation certificates on former gas and oil leases often
come before the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board. Both the Environ-
mental Ministry and the gas and oil companies have at their disposal the
financial resources to hire technical experts in reclamation (not to
mention the fact that these parties have the experience of involvement in
multiple cases). Individual land owners may not have such resources or
even realize they need such expertise. Should a board or a mediator
intervene to address this problem? And if so, how?
64. This is the preferred practice of the Alberta EAB.
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At present, Canadian environmental tribunals are seeking to address
this problem in two ways.65 First, the Nova Scotia Environmental
Assessment Board is attempting to create a trust fund to provide parties
with legal and technical advice during the course of ADR proceedings.
66
This fund would be of particular benefit to lay persons who do not have
the resources or knowledge to address technical issues on their own.
Second, some other tribunals (such as the BAPE and the Ontario Energy
Board) will make their own expertise or the expertise of their staff
available to the parties on an ad hoc basis during the course of a
mediation.
67
In addition to the above options, there are other techniques that can be
employed to protect against power imbalances and ensure that technical
and scientific issues are properly explored. First, a mediator can explore
with the parties if both want more time to gather additional information.
All parties may agree to a continuance in order for one or more to gather
additional information. Of course, one party may see that they have an
advantage in the other's lack of knowledge or skill, and seek to exploit it.
Thus, the mediator may risk compromising his or her neutrality by
suggesting a continuance. Second, tribunals can help ill-prepared parties
through the intake process. The intake process might include questions
about the party's access to and use of technical and legal resources,
remind them of their rights under applicable laws, and encourage them to
seek the requisite expert advice. Third, tribunals can provide parties at the
time of intake with a list of technical and legal experts to whom the parties
65. Another option is fee shifting or awarding costs. For instance, s. 88 of the Environmental
Protection and Enhancement Act, S.A. 1992, c. E-13.3 states:
88 The Board may award costs of and incidental to any proceedings before it on a final or
interim basis and may, in accordance with the regulations, direct by whom and to whom any
costs are to be paid.
66. This trust fund does not exist at present and, since the board's draft mediation guidelines
have not been completed, they have not yet fully determined the mechanics of how the trust
fund would work. However, an interviewee from the Board stated that such funds or expertise
would likely be made available to all parties on an equal basis. At present, the Board has the
discretion to allocate budgetary funds for the purposes of retaining experts during the course
of public hearings. However, the Board has not yet exercised this discretion during the course
of a mediation.
67. For example, the Ontario Energy Board "Settlement Conference Guidelines" state:
"Board staff will attend the settlement conference to ensure that all relevant information is
brought forward and considered in negotiations. They will present options for the consideration
of the parties and will offer advice on the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' proposals.
Staff will endeavor to help the parties to reach a settlement ... " As noted by an interviewee
from the Energy Board, staff are bound by confidentiality obligations and, upon the completion
of the Settlement Conference, their participation in any subsequent hearing is circumscribed
by these obligations.
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can turn, including possible low-cost or subsidized assistance. Lastly, the
parties may agree as part of the final settlement that they undertake joint
fact finding on particular issues, and if the later data suggests the
agreement should be modified, then the parties can reconvene.
Board members with particular technical expertise may be tempted to
be helpful by offering substantive technical advice to the parties during
mediation. While understandably tempting, we believe the above options
can offer fair protection of all parties while avoiding the problems
inherent with board members acting as technical experts. First, we
imagine that it may be impossible to offer such advice without seriously
offending one party or the other. The mediator is likely to aid the parties
more by asking focused, informed questions and encouraging the parties
to explore key technical issues, than by rendering authoritative technical
opinions. Second, by offering such substantive technical advice, the
mediator opens up the possibility of counter-arguments and challenges,
quickly turning the mediation into a technical dispute, with the once-
mediator now one of the warring experts. Lastly, by moving into the
realm of substantive technical merits, the helm of process management-
the key role of the mediator-is likely to be left untended as the parties,
including the mediator, turn to technical claims, arguments, and counter-
arguments.
4. Should Confidentiality Be Protected?
An important issue raised in the context of designing environmental ADR
systems is whether, and to what extent, the confidentiality of the parties
must be protected. In Canada, at present, there is considerable variation
with regard to the level of confidentiality considered appropriate in the
environmental ADR context. At one end of the spectrum, some tribunals
have no explicit protections regarding confidentiality in their ADR
processes. 68 A good example of such a tribunal is the BAPE in Quebec,
which has made an explicit choice not to protect the confidentiality of
68. In Manitoba, for example, there are no formal confidentiality protections in the Clean
Environment Commission's mediations. According to an interviewee from the Commission,
it prefers openness (which is part of its mandate) and would be very cautious about introducing
confidentiality protections. In British Columbia, no protections for confidentiality are included
in the Environmental Appeal Board's processes, although this is largely because it does not
generally use ADR techniques.
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evidence or documents in mediation.69 At the other end of the spectrum,
there are tribunals, such as the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Agency (CEAA)7 ° and the Ontario Environmental and Appeal Board,71
that provide extensive confidentiality protection. Even among the tribu-
nals that offer these guarantees, there is variation with respect to the
nature and breadth of the protections accorded.
Consider the contrast between the rules adopted by the CEAA and the
Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board. Under the CEAA
procedure, anything said by the mediator or an interested party during the
mediation is privileged, although not necessarily confidential.72 By
contrast, the Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board's
confidentiality protection is much broader, and stipulates that the content
of discussions during the mediation process (and documents prepared as
part of the mediation process) are not only privileged, but also will not be
communicated at any time by the mediator to non-parties, the public, the
media or the panel without the consent of all parties. Finally, some
tribunals in other Canadian jurisdictions have taken an intermediate
position with respect to the protection of confidentiality in ADR proceed-
69. At the BAPE, the meetings between the parties during mediation are recorded by a
stenographer and the BAPE makes a practice of releasing transcripts of the mediation to the
public. In addition, since the BAPE has all the power incidental to a public inquiry, it can
actually compel the production of confidential documents which may also be released to the
public at the discretion of the BAPE. Environmental Quality Act, R.S.Q. c. Q-2, art. 6.7; see
also P. Renaud, "Comparison entre la mrdiation administrative et publique appliqure dans le
domaine de l'environnement et la mediation privre" (1994-1995) 25 R.D.U.S. 345 at 350.
70. For example, under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37,
explicit provision is made for the protection of evidence introduced or statements made during
the course of a mediation. Section 32(2) reads as follows:
No evidence of or relating to a statement made by a mediator or a participant to the mediation
during the course of and for the purposes of the mediation is admissible without the consent
of the mediator or participant, in any proceeding before a review panel, court, tribunal, body
or person with jurisdiction to compel the production of evidence.
71. In the Ontario Environmental and Appeal Board's Rules of Practice regarding settlement
conferences, it is stipulated that the Board may exclude everyone but the parties from the
settlement conference, that all documents submitted and all statements made at the settlement
conference are confidential and without prejudice, and that no confidential documents are
accessible to the public. In addition, the Ontario Environmental and Appeal Board's Guide-
lines for Board-Appointed Facilitators and Mediators state that the content of discussions
during the mediation process (and documents prepared as part of the mediation process) are
privileged, and will not be communicated at any time by the mediator to non-parties, the public,
the media or the panel without the consent of all parties. The Ontario Energy Board has similar
Guidelines with regard to confidentiality. Their Settlement Guidelines impose a duty of
confidentiality on Board staff and mediators who participate. They can only disclose factual
information revealed at the hearing. In addition, any admissions or confessions on the part of
the parties at the hearing are protected by privilege. The Alberta Environmental Appeal Board
requires all the parties to sign a mediation agreement which obliges them to keep the contents
of the mediation, and any documents used therein, confidential.
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ings by promising to protect some statements and documents, but not
others.73
The varying approaches to the protection of confidentiality74 adopted
by different administrative tribunals in Canada reflect an underlying
tension between two competing policy considerations: promoting settle-
ments and ensuring third-party access to the public policy making
process.75 It is well recognized in the academic literature that confiden-
tiality forms an essential part of successful mediation because it fosters
an atmosphere of trust. 76 As was stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court
Task Force on Dispute Resolution:
[s]uccess of the mediation process requires strict confidentiality so that the
parties participating feel that they may be open and honest among
themselves. In order to create a climate of trust, participants must be
assured that revelations made during the mediation process will be held in
strictest confidence by the mediator. Without such assurances, disputants
may be unwilling to reveal relevant information and may be hesitant to
disclose potential accommodations that might appear to compromise the
positions they have taken.77
72. Thus, no evidence of such statements is admissible in any legal proceeding without the
consent of the person who made the statement. However, the interested parties are free to
disclose each other's statements to any person for any purpose outside a legal proceeding.
73. For example, at the Nova Scotia Environmental Assessment Board, a balance has been
struck between the public interest in openness in all hearings and the interests of the parties in
confidentiality. The Environmental Assessment Regulation N.S. Reg. 26/95 and Environmen-
tal Assessment Board Regulation N.S. Reg. 27/95 contain provisions for the protection of
business information. However, this protection is defined to exclude the "environmental
effects or associated mitigation measures of the undertaking," thus preventing them from being
insulated from public scrutiny in all cases.
74. Of course, under the general umbrella of "protection of confidentiality," there are really
many issues to be addressed, including: (1) whether communications between the parties and
the mediator should be protected by a legal privilege or some other form of confidentiality
protection; (2) whether communications between the parties themselves should be protected
by a privilege or some other form of confidentiality protection; (3) whether the protection of
confidentiality should extend to both documents and statements; (4) whether confidentiality
extends to all forms of communication or simply communication concerning those issues in
dispute; (5) whether there should be public policy exceptions to the protection of confidenti-
ality; (6) who can enforce the confidentiality protections (i.e., the parties themselves,
independent professionals, tribunals, courts); and (7) who the confidentiality protections can
be enforced against. See generally E.D. Green, "A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege"
(1986) 2 Ohio St. J. Dis. Res. 1 at 5-11 [hereinafter "A Heretical View"].
75. "Resolving Environmental Disputes," supra note 5 at 522.
76. See "Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation" note (1984) 98 Harv. L. Rev. 441 at 441
[hereinafter "Harvard Note"]; J.P. McCrory, "Environmental Mediation - Another Piece for
the Puzzle" (1981) 6 Vt. L. Rev. 49 at 56.
77. New Jersey State Supreme Court Task Force On Dispute Resolution Final Report 23
(1990), cited in E.R. Max, "Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation" (1993) 2 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L.J. 210 at 210-211 [hereinafter "Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation"].
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Parties entering into mediation may be concerned about several types of
disclosure, including: papers or documents generated during the media-
tion becoming evidence at a subsequent hearing or trial; an administrative
panel or trial judge learning the content of discussions or admissions
made during the mediation; outside parties gaining confidential informa-
tion; and disclosure of the settlement agreement itself.78 If there are no
assurances of protection with respect to some or all of these forms of
disclosure, the risk is that many parties may be deterred from consenting
to mediation, thereby rendering the process ineffective.79
Although properly addressing confidentiality concerns is clearly an
important prerequisite to promoting effective mediation practices gener-
ally, in the environmental administrative context these concerns must be
balanced against important countervailing public policy considerations.
The administrative process is designed, in part, to protect the public
interest and to highlight societal norms intended to guide future con-
duct.80 In this regard, it is important to recognize that, where settlements
are reached in environmental mediation, these settlements affect not only
the parties involved but also affect societal norms and many people who
are not directly involved. As Eric Max has observed, some of the indirect
effects of environmental settlements include: (1) health concerns result-
ing from damage to the environment; (2) financial costs associated with
clean-up and monitoring; and (3) lower property values and other indirect
effects.8" Given the widespread impact of many environmental settle-
ments, there is a strong argument that the public has a right to know the
justification and informational basis for such settlements (particularly
when governmental agencies are involved in the settlement discussions)
and to be informed of specific commitments, if any, that were made in the
process. In the absence of such publicly available information, there is a
78. "Resolving Environmental Disputes," supra note 5 at 527.
79. This is because effective mediation is based upon the principle of consent. As stated in
the "Harvard Note" supra note 76 at 443-45, "mediation is essentially a form of negotiation:
the parties reach agreement voluntarily and thus retain the power to shape both the agenda for
discussion and the ultimate agreement. The mediator, unlike ajudge, acts primarily as a catalyst
for this process; he cannot compel the production of information, and he does not render
judgment.... The mediator's inability to coerce the parties, however, makes it essential that
he be able to make a simple and credible promise of confidentiality. To assess the possibilities
of settlement fully, however, the mediator ... must be apprised of the parties' real positions
and interests. The efficacy of this factfinding process depends on the mediator's ability to
ensure the confidentiality of communications made to him." [footnotes omitted].
80. P. Harter, "Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements
by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality" (1989) 41 Ad. L.Rev. 315 at 317 [hereinafter "Neither
Cop Nor Collection Agent"].
81. "Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation," supra note 77 at 211.
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reasonable concern that mediation behind closed doors may undermine
the public's confidence in the resulting agreement.8 2
How, then, should the balance between these two competing policy
considerations be struck? There are several different views on this matter.
Many commentators have suggested that mediation requires a level of
protection comparable to a very strong attorney-client privilege.83 Other
commentators have recommended making the process open so that
outside parties can have greater access. 84 Still others have recommended
that a privilege or protection of some sort should be accorded, but that
exceptions should be created to prevent against abuse85 and damage to the
public interest.86 In our view, it is simply too difficult to state one rule that
will cover all environmental mediation. A contextual approach may
suggest a differing level of confidentiality depending upon the nature of
the tribunal and the mandate involved. Specifically, the more the tribunal
approximates a quasi-judicial setting (i.e., where a specific dispute
concerning the rights of the parties is being resolved), the more attention
should be paid to the need to protect confidentiality.87 The parties may
82. "Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent," supra note 80 at 341.
83. Liepmann in "Confidentiality," supra note 39 at 123-24, for example, suggests a
mediation privilege modelled along the lines of the Wigmore test. According to the Wigmore
balancing test, the following four conditions must be met in order to establish a privilege
against disclosure of communications between persons standing in a given relationship: (1)
communications must originate in confidence that they will not be disclosed to others (2) the
preservation of secrecy must be essential to the success of the relationship; (3) the relationship
is one which the public ought to foster and protect; (4) the injury from disclosure must be greater
than the benefit to be gained by the public from non-disclosure. See also "Resolving
Environmental Disputes," supra note 5 at 537, and L.R. Freedman & M.L. Prigoff, "Confiden-
tiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection" (1986) 2 Ohio St. J. Dis. Res. 37 at 37.
84. See "A Heretical View," supra note 74 at 2, climing that "the current campaign to obtain
a blanket mediation privilege rests on faulty logic, inadequate data and short-sighted profes-
sional self-interest."
85. "Confidentiality," supra note 39 at 123-24. For example, suggests one risk of an overly
broad privilege is that unscrupulous parties could choose to mediate precisely because they
want to escape public disclosure of certain facts and information, and thereby use the mediation
process as a shield.
86. For example, one question raised with respect to the creation of a legal privilege is what
should happen if a tribunal learns of a serious contravention of the legislation during a
confidential mediation. Can the privilege be used to protect against the disclosure of such
important information? The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 574
[hereinafter the "ADR Act"] deals with this issue by creating an exception to confidentiality
where a court determines that disclosure is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, establish
a violation of law, or prevent harm to the public health or safety.
87. That being said, it is also our view that a blanket privilege would be inappropriate in
almost any administrative context, given the public interest responsibilities of most agencies.
At the very least, we believe that any privilege accorded should be subject to public policy
exceptions along the lines adopted in the "ADR Act," ibid.
Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices 87
fear that anything they say during mediation could later be held against
them in formal proceedings, and thus, offer little information. Without
the necessary confidentiality protections, the parties will most likely rely
on their lawyers, trained to handle such "dangers," to make all represen-
tations before the tribunal. A classic example is an apology. A "wronged"
party may want, among other things, a simple "sorry" for the harm done
to them. In an informal, private setting such an apology may be easy to
offer. However, if the apology is viewed as a legal representation of an
admission of fault or guilt in a formal proceeding, then the very thing that
might help settle the case is simply not possible.
The more a proceeding approximates a wide-ranging administrative or
public hearing-style investigation, the less justification there is for
confidentiality. In short, the more the tribunals' general practices are
conducted fully in the public eye, the less confidentiality the board can
grant parties in a mediation. In the case of the BAPE, for example, the
tribunal has a wide mandate to conduct a public inquiry and can, at any
moment, exercise its discretion to terminate the mediation and compel all
parties to participate in a public hearing with full disclosure. In such
cases, there is less incentive for the parties to forego mediation and
proceed to the hearing because, even in that context, they could be
required to make full disclosure at the hearing anyway.88
How settlement conversations are structured should be carefully
considered. The agreement, and at least some broad summary of the
proceedings, can be produced for public scrutiny while the actual media-
tion takes place in an informal, less public setting. Administrative
tribunals must consider ways they can successfully balance the need for
some measure of privacy (to encourage full disclosure and frank talk)
while allowing for full public disclosure and scrutiny.
5. Should ADR Proceedings be Mandatory?
At present, a substantial majority of Canadian environmental administra-
tive bodies have chosen voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, ADR
processes. Indeed, at present, there are no examples of truly mandatory
ADR processes in the environmental administrative context.89 However,
several of the administrative boards are currently employing mandatory
pre-hearing conferences. For example, the Ontario Environmental As-
88. However, the BAPE also recognizes that its chances of promoting settlements are reduced
because it insists upon the complete transparency of its proceedings. This is a tradeoff that its
mandate requires it to make, and that it has consciously made.
89. The closest that any board in Canada comes to mandatory mediation is the Ontario Energy
Board's "Settlement Conference," which is technically voluntary but which is de facto
obligatory to the extent that the Board expects it, and that the conference may continue without
the parties if they refuse to attend.
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sessment and Appeal Board has the discretion to order the parties to
attend a mandatory "preliminary hearing," the purpose of which is to
identify parties and simplify and narrow issues, among other things. The
Alberta Environmental Appeal Board has adopted a similar practice with
its "pre-hearing meetings," the purpose of which is to facilitate the
resolution of the appeal or to clarify procedural matters and scope
jurisdictional issues.
Despite the lack of mandatory ADR in the Canadian administra-
tive environmental context, the question of mandatory mediation has
recently become a live issue in Canadian law. This is because the Ontario
provincial government recently introduced a major reform instituting
mandatory court-annexed ADR in the civil justice system, to be phased
in during 1998. Following the results of a two-year pilot project which
showed that approximately half the cases sent to ADR settled and that
disputants were less likely to opt into the settlement process if it remained
voluntary, 90 an Ontario government-appointed Civil Justice Task Force
recommended the implementation of mandatory ADR in the civil justice
system.91 In addition, there has been a ground swell of Canadian aca-
demic legal commentary in support of mandatory ADR. McLaren and
Sanderson, for example, argue mandatory mediation may be a positive
development for the following reasons:
The annexation of alternative dispute resolution techniques to the litiga-
tion process will have positive effects for each mechanism of resolution.
For example, in Ontario the fact that mediation is a mandatory stage
following the close of pleadings may have the positive effect of educating
a broader range of disputants to the existence and benefits of alternative
dispute resolution. Furthermore, even where resolution at the annexed
mediation stage is not successful, the session may help to narrow the issues
and clarify the facts, thus helping to streamline the remaining stages of the
litigation process. Finally, the costs to the individual associated with
bringing an action may be substantially reduced if the matter can be
resolved at the mediation stage. 92
In the American literature, there has been similar praise for mandatory
mediation. McEwan and Milburn, for example, have argued that one of
the paradoxes of mandatory mediation is that "reluctant parties often use
mediation effectively and evaluate their mediation experiences posi-
tively."93 As noted by Sherman:
90. J. Macfarlane, "Court-Based Mediation for Civil Cases: An Evaluation of the Ontario
Court (General Division) ADR Centre" (Toronto, 1995).
91. Supplemental and Final Report, supra note 2 at 52-57.
92. R. McLaren & J.P. Sanderson, Innovative Dispute Resolution: The Alternative (Toronto,
1998) at CAP 2-3.
93. C.A. McEwan & T.W. Milbum, "Explaining a Paradox of Mediation" (1993) 9 Neg. J.
23. See also E. Sherman, "Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution: What Form of
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Most mediators have encountered the situation where parties announce at
the beginning of the process that they are only there because they were
ordered to participate by the court or other authority and that they will not
compromise their positions in any way. Many of these situations still result
in settlements, indicating that freedom of control over the content and
presentation of their cases is often more important to the satisfactory
operation of ADR than whether the parties were forced initially to
participate.
94
Along similar lines, Silberman and Schepard have also found that court-
ordered mediation may be helpful in convincing initially resistant parties
that compromises and cooperation are useful in resolving differences.95
There are also many commentators who have expressed grave con-
cerns about the use of mandatory mediation.96 The primary concern with
mandatory mediation is that it creates a risk that parties will be coerced
into settling their dispute. Since one of the fundamental principles of
mediation (and other ADR processes) is self-determination, which is
closely tied to voluntary choice, the potential for such coercion is
problematic, particularly where there is a power differential among the
parties.9 7 Such power differentials often arise in the environmental
context, where disputes frequently pit individual citizens or environmen-
tal interest groups against industry or government. A secondary concern
with mandatory mediation relates to cost. While there is little question
that a successful result in an ADR process will reduce overall costs for the
administrative body and the parties involved, if the mediation is not
successful and a full hearing is necessary, costs will increase commensu-
rately.98 Lastly, if all tribunals require mediation prior to formal proceed-
Participation Should be Required?" (1993) 46 S.M.U. L. Rev. 2079 at 2088 [hereinafter
"Court-Mandated ADR"].
94. "Court-Mandated ADR," ibid. at 2088-89.
95. L. Silberman & A. Schepard (1986) "Court-Ordered Mediation in Family Disputes: The
New York Proposal" 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 741 at 746, cited in S. Lubet, "Some
Early Observations on an Experiment with Mandatory Mediation" (1989) 4 Ohio St. J. Disp.
Res. 235 at 237. See also C.A. McEwen & R.J. Maiman, "Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent" (1984) 18 Law & Soc. Rev. 11, where the authors
reported relatively high satisfaction and compliance with agreements reached following court-
ordered participation in mediation.
96. This includes the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution who, in Mandated
Participation and Settlement Coercion: Dispute Resolution As It Relates to the Courts (1991)
(cited in L. Katz, "Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two Headed
Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?" (1993)1 J. Disp. Res. 1 at 52 [hereinafter "Compulsory
ADR"], recommended caution in implementing mandatory mediation. See also G. Ferrick
"Three Crucial Questions" (1986) 13 Mediation Q. 61, posing the question whether mandatory
mediation provisions violate the cooperative spirit of mediation.
97. See A. Nelle, "Making Mediation Mandatory: A Proposed Framework" (1992) 7 J. Disp.
Res. 287 at 287. See also "Compulsory ADR," ibid. at 13-16.
98. "Environmental Appeal Boards," supra note 4 at 76.
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ings, mediation could become little more than aproforma exercise where
the parties participate only reluctantly and with little active interest. In
turn, this perception would diminish the effectiveness of mediation
overall, even in cases where it was quite appropriate and useful. This has
already happened in some collective bargaining contexts where griev-
ance mediation is a mandatory step that the parties tolerate while they
wait for arbitration to "kick in."
Despite the above concerns, there is support among some administra-
tive tribunal members for the implementation of some form of mandatory
ADR in the environmental context. In our view, this would be a mistake.
If mediation truly saves time, saves money, and really produces wiser and
more effective agreements, it will sell itself. If it does not, making it
mandatory will only create an unnecessary additional administrative
burden on tribunals and likely result in a general backlash against ADR
in general.
A common concern expressed by tribunal members during the inter-
view process was that ADR is not sufficiently understood by the public
and that many citizens are not aware of its advantages. As discussed by
McLaren and Sanderson, one of the more compelling justifications for
mandatory mediation is that it serves an important educative function.99
However, we argue that there are alternatives to mandatory mediation for
informing and educating consumers about mediation, such as providing
conflict assessment and consumer-oriented fact sheets and brochures
prior to pre-hearing settlement conferences. Arguments for a greater
investment in public education are well founded, but we do not think
mandatory mediation is the necessary response.
To address the concerns raised by proponents of mandatory mediation,
we recommend that the case intake process could become a "mandatory"
part of all cases, informing parties of their dispute resolution options
(hearings versus mediation, for instance, or a simple pre-hearing confer-
ence) and providing enough information so that the Board can wisely
refer and/or encourage cases to go on to mediation or directly to formal
hearings. This, we feel, would increase education and awareness of
mediation while still preserving the essential value of a voluntary and
consensual process entered into freely.
99. This point was made by an interviewee from the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board,
among others.
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6. Under What Standard Should Agreements Be Reviewed by
Tribunals and Courts?
Once settlement is reached among the parties in a mediation, to what
extent should administrative tribunals review the content of their agree-
ment? This is a difficult question and there are, in fact, a range of
approaches that have been adopted by tribunals in the Canadian context.
At one extreme are the administrative boards that review agreements only
broadly, if at all. These include the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board
and the National Energy Board."° At the other extreme are the Boards
that adopt an active approach to reviewing all agreements reached in
docketed cases.' 01 The Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal
Board has the most detailed guidelines with regard to the review of
settlements.'0 2 The Ontario Energy Board also takes a similar ap-
proach.0 3 Finally, there are several Boards which do not review agree-
100. The National Energy Board does not review mediated settlements. However, the
National Energy Board also does not generally employ mediation as part of its hearing process,
and only permits the parties to reach an agreement in certain limited post-hearing circum-
stances (such as compensation of use of private land for pipelines).
101. The Board does not review settlement agreements although, until the present day, a
Board member has always participated in mediations and therefore been able to monitor the
settlement process. One Board member stated in an interview that it is not certain that the Board
in fact has jurisdiction to review many agreements. In many appeals, it is the Department of
the Environment that is bringing the appeal. In cases where the Department is prepared to
consent to an agreement with an individual and has chosen not to proceed with the appeal, it
is not apparent that this matter is any longer "before the Board." It should be noted that the
Alberta EAB member who mediates must also sign the agreement in a report to the Minister.
Environmental Appeal Board Regulation, Alta. Reg. 114/93, s. 12.
102. Pursuant to its "Protocol for Consideration of Agreements," the Board states that it will
not accept settlement agreements at face value. Prior to approving a settlement it must be
satisfied that it represents the "combined interests" of the proponent, the regulatory agency,
those affected (i.e., citizens groups and individuals) and affected governments. In addition, it
must be satisfied that the agreement is consistent with the purpose and provisions of the relevant
legislation and is in the public interest. The Board panel will hold a hearing (often an oral
hearing) to determine whether there is "logical and traceable" documentation and a rationale
to support each aspect of the agreement.
103. The Ontario Energy Board's Settlement Guidelines provide that the Board must approve
any agreement reached between the parties prior to making it part of a Board Order. Although
the Guidelines specify that the Board is supposed to either approve the agreement in its entirety
or send the parties back to negotiations, in practice the Board has been more activist in
"tinkering" with the substance of the deals.
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ments upon completion, but instead take an active role in supervising and
facilitating the negotiation process, such as the BAPE.' °4 In some
jurisdictions, of course, final approval, of agreements rests with the
Minister, who conducts the final review.10 5
The review, or non-review, of settlement agreements raises a difficult
policy question relating to what in the United States has been called the
"delegation doctrine." As Perritt has observed, a central precept of
democratic theory is that governmental decisions ought to be made by
politically accountable officials. The delegation doctrine prohibits offi-
cials from delegating their policy-making authority to persons or institu-
tions that are not democratically accountable."° For this reason, delega-
tion concerns are raised every time an administrative tribunal adopts a
mediated agreement reached between private parties concerning a matter
that falls within the tribunal's rule-making or regulatory responsibilities.
Accordingly, courts in the United States have scrutinized quite carefully
the delegation of regulation-making power to private citizens.107 For
example, in Carterv. Carter Coal Co.,10 8 the Supreme Court struck down
Congress' attempt to authorize a majority of coal producers and miners
to set industry-wide wages and hours, calling legislative delegation to
private groups "legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it
is not even delegation to an official body, presumptively disinterested,
but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the
interests of the others in the business." In Canada, a similar doctrine exists
104. According to a member of the BAPE, the BAPE plays a directive role in the negotiations
and ensures during the process that the parties are complying with relevant legislation and
regulations and the public interest. The Nova Scotia Environmental Assessment Board also
adopts an active role in the mediation process, including providing the parties with technical
and legal expertise and submitting a detailed report to the Minister at the conclusion of the
mediation concerning the process that was employed, the specific disagreements between the
parties, the issues canvassed and the offers and counteroffers made. In this way the Minister
has all the information to make a final determination whether to approve or disapprove the
agreement.
105. This is the case, for example, with the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C.
1992, c. 37, mediation process, which is conducted by an independent mediator who makes a
final report to the Minister. The same is true with respect to Manitoba's environmental
assessment process under its Environment Act.
106. H.H. Perritt, "Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of Recom-
mendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States" (1986) 74 Geo. L.J. 1625
at 1693 [hereinafter "Negotiated Rulemaking"].
107. See generally "Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking" note (1981) 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1871 at 1881-82.
108. 298 U.S. 238 at 311 (1936).
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and is expressed in terms of the principle of "delegatus non potest
delegare."'' 9 Essentially, this doctrine prohibits the sub-delegation of
administrative power absent an express or implied grant of statutory
authority. Willis has explained the doctrine in the following terms:
The maxim delegatus nonpotest delegare enunciates a rule of construction
for interpreting statutes which confer upon governmental authorities the
power to decide questions affecting the rights of the public; it applies to all
types of authority, central, local or professional, and all types of discretion,
legislative, judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative. The rule of con-
struction prescribes that to any statute which confers a discretion upon a
named authority, the word "personally" should be added after the name of
the authority."'
As noted by Holland and McGowan, the Canadian courts have specifi-
cally applied the rule against sub-delegation where a body authorized to
make regulations has acted solely on the basis of advice of a third party
(and thereby failed to exercise its discretion) in making a regulation. They
note that such cases "offend our expectation that rule makers have some
notion of why they are making the rules.""'1
The problem raised in the environmental context is that many of the
administrative tribunals in question have a specific mandate to protect the
environment or the public interest, and to promulgate rules that have an
impact on both the environment and the public interest. When parties
reach an agreement on their own, there is a serious risk that the public
interest will not be properly served unless that agreement involves or is
at least reviewed by an accountable administrative official. Such a
problem was raised in an interview with an Ontario Energy Board
interviewee, who noted that the Board's Settlement Guidelines have
produced some concern among Board members with respect to a poten-
tial delegation of its statutory mandate." 2 Section 19 of the Ontario
Energy Board Act requires the Board to make a decision based upon
"evidence adduced at the hearing." However, if a settlement is reached
prior to the hearing, there is as yet no "evidence adduced" and the Board
109. J. Willis, "Delegatus Non Potest Delegate" (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257.
110. Ibid. at 263-64.
111. D.C. Holland & J.P. McGowan, Delegated Legislation in Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1989) at 133 [hereinafter Delegated Legislation].
112. A similar concern was discussed by an interviewee from the Alberta Environmental
Appeal Board. The interviewee noted that the Board has been reluctant to appoint outside
mediators precisely because they are not trained concerning the EAB's specific mandate and
there is a concern that they will not adequately protect the public interest (i.e., there is danger
of at least the perception of deals made behind closed doors).
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risks being reduced to a "rubber stamp."'"13 This is a problem because the
Board is a rule-making authority, and its decisions with regard to natural
gas rates and pipeline infrastructure have precedential value and a
substantial impact upon the public interest in Ontario.
A further problem raised by the non-review of settlements by admin-
istrative tribunals relates to the standard of judicial review to be applied
by the courts. It is now well established in Canadian law that, where a
tribunal is acting within its jurisdiction and has expertise in its particular
field, a decision by the tribunal will be entitled to a significant degree of
deference by the courts on judicial review unless that decision is "patently
unreasonable." ' 14 In Alberta, for instance, the courts have, at least up to
the present, deferred to the expertise of the Environmental Appeal
Board." 5 Generally, although there have been no cases as yet expressly
addressing the question of the standard of review to be applied to
decisions by some environmental tribunals, 116 it is reasonable to question
113. An interviewee from Ontario Energy Board noted that one solution to this problem
adopted by the Board has been the development of a practice whereby the Settlement
Agreements between the parties will refer back to pre-filed evidence. This satisfies the
requirement (at least technically) that the agreement be based upon "evidence adduced at the
hearing."
114. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp.,
[1979] 2 S.C.R. 227; National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal), [1990] 2
S.C.R. 1324; see also S. Blake, Administrative Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992)
at 176-77. To the extent that expertise is an issue, the courts have recognized a "hierarchy" of
tribunals in Canada determined according to their statutory qualifications and the status of their
members. According to this hierarchy, adhoc tribunals appointed on a case-by-case basis have
less claim to deference than permanently established bodies with specified terms and expert
members such as Labour Boards or the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunication
Commission. See generally D. Mullan, "Administrative Law" (1997) C.E.D. (Ontario) (3d) at
375-76.
115. Kostuch v. Environmental Appeal Board, et al., [1996] 21 C.E.L.R. (N.S.), Graham v.
Alberta (Director, Chemical Assessment and Management, Alberta Environmental Protec-
tion) [ 1996], 22 C.E.L.R. (N.S.), and 425167Alberta Limited, operating as Bottle Bin Bottle
Depot et al v. EnvironmentalAppeal Board (Action No. 9803 10403) (June 18, 1998).
116. In Reese v. Alberta (Ministry of Forestry, Lands and Wildlife) (1992), 7 C.E.L.R. (N.S.)
89 (Alta.Q.B.), McDonald J. considered whether the "patent unreasonableness" standard
applied to a decision by the Alberta Minister to enter into a forest management agreement
authorized by the Alberta Forests Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. F-16. He concluded that it did not
because there was no privative clause and because the patent unreasonableness standard does
not apply to a discretionary ministerial decision. He stated, at 116, that "[a] Minister of the
Crown is not given such a discretion because he is likely to possess expertise in the subject for
which the legislature has given him the power to act. The traditions of responsible government
do not imply that a Minister is likely to have expertise in that area of responsibility." However,
this decision left open the question whether the patent unreasonableness standard would apply
to the decision of an expert body such as the National Energy Board or the Alberta
Environmental Appeal Board, for example. See A.R. Lucas, "Judicial Review of Environmen-
tal Assessment: Has the Federal Process Been Judicialized?" in S. Kennett, ed., Law and
Process in Environmental Management (Calgary: Canadian Institute of Resources Law, 1993)
170 at 190.
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whether judicial deference would apply in the same manner where an
"expert" tribunal has merely approved a settlement, as it would where the
Board has actually made a decision within its expertise based upon a
review of all the evidence. Would the courts feel compelled to step in
where the Board had not? The problem in such cases is that the tribunal
is not bringing its expertise to bear on the administrative problem in
question and is instead relying upon a consensus reached among others.
On the other hand, because mediation is touted as a voluntary, ad hoc
process where the parties "own" the solution, parties themselves may
resent, or even oppose, any undue "tinkering" by the tribunal, even if they
do not challenge the tribunal in court.I 7 To the parties, their agreements
often represent a "seamless whole" in which each party has made delicate
tradeoffs in order to reach an agreement. "8s For the tribunal to change the
deal in any way, the parties generally argue, would upset that delicate
balance, not to mention undermine their decision-making and account-
ability. Having an outside party review and "judge" the agreement post-
settlement may also be seen as akin to second-guessing the parties'
collective judgment, leading the parties to conclude, "Why bother medi-
ating if the case is going to be judged anyway? Let's not waste our time.
We can go before the judges instead."
The foregoing issues illustrate, once again, the need for a contextual
analysis, and the on-going challenge of balancing the public interest with
the requirements of successful mediation. A key consideration with
regard to both the delegation doctrine and the appropriate standard of
judicial review is the specific nature of the statutory mandate of the
administrative agency in question. Holland and McGowan note, for
example, that the delegatus non potest delegare rule is applied with
varying degrees of rigour depending upon the nature of the power being
exercised. Where the power is of an incidental, administrative nature, the
courts are less likely to be concerned than with sub-delegation where the
power is characterized as legislative or judicial. 19 Thus, where an
administrative tribunal is acting in merely an advisory capacity, such as
the BAPE, there would seem to be less concern with sub-delegation and
less of a need for careful review of agreements by the administrative
agency in question. In such cases, the Minister retains full decision-
making authority, and the principle of democratic accountability is
117. It should be noted that mediated decisions (settlements) have rarely, if ever, gone to
court. In Alberta, no settlement mediated and reviewed by the EAB has ever been challenged
in court.
118. An interviewee from the Ontario Energy Board made this observation in the interview.
119. Delegated Legislation, supra note 111 at 122-123.
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maintained. 120 By contrast, where a Board such as the Ontario Environ-
mental Assessment and Appeal Board exercises a power of decision with
potentially substantial rule-making ramifications, far greater concerns
are raised with respect to sub-delegation. For this reason, rigorous
guidelines may be advisable.
More broadly, however, perhaps the courts themselves need to de-
velop a more flexible standard ofjudicial review to account for the unique
administrative dynamic raised by the application of ADR techniques.
Rather than looking merely to the administrative tribunal's expertise
concerning the substantive issues, the courts might instead look more
carefully at the extent to which the tribunals take an active role in ensuring
the fairness of the settlement process. Such a revised standard of review
has also been proposed in the American administrative rule-making
context by Philip Harter"'1 and by Susan Sturm. 122 In that context, Harter
suggests a deferential attitude according to which the courts "should
sustain a rule developed under a consensual process to the extent that the
rule is within the authority of the agency and does reflect a consensus
120. "Negotiated Rulemaking," supra note 106 at 1693.
121. Harter suggests that a negotiated rule should be sustained by the courts to the extent that
it is within the agency's jurisdiction and actually reflects a consensus among the interested
parties. This standard of review has several major components, which include determinations
of standing, a rule's conformity with applicable statutes and adequacy of interest representa-
tion. He notes that this standard is designed to impose the appropriate incentives on the various
players. The incentives include encouraging the relevant interests to come forward and
participate (since they may not if they know the result might be overturned in the courts);
encouraging the agency to refrain from unjustified modifications of the negotiated proposal;
and encouraging all interests concerned with a proposed rule to make their concerns know to
the agency so that appropriate action can be taken, P.J. Harter, "Negotiating Regulations: A
Cure for Malaise" (1982) 71 Geo. L.J. I at 102-07.
122. S.P. Sturm, "A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies" (1991) 79 Geo. L.J. 1355
[hereinafter "Normative Theory"].
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among the interests significantly affected."' 2 3 A.R. Reid has suggested a
similar approach in the Canadian administrative context. He states:
It has been conventional wisdom for many years that regulatory agencies
are the guardians of the public interest. The acceptance of ADR as a
regulatory approach does not force agencies to abdicate this role. Instead
ADR invites regulators to protect the public interest in a different way.
Rather than assuming that the public interest can only be served by having
an agency make decisions in an adjudicative hearing after listening to
interested parties lead evidence and advance submissions in an adversarial
mode, regulatory agencies are invited to see themselves as impartial
guardians of a collaborative decision-making process. Agencies can do
this by convening a process and keeping the playing field level, i.e. by
addressing power imbalances and preventing conflicts of interest. They
nurture and secure the public interest by enabling the interested parties to
express it themselves, in the policies in which they concur.'24
Taking these considerations into account, it would be quite possible to
adapt the above reviewed judicial review standard in a functional manner
to the environmental context. Such a standard would have to take into
account the specific statutory mandate of the board in question, and the
nature and extent of its participation in the settlement process. Thus, in
reviewing administrative approval of settlement agreements, courts
could look at the following factors, among others: whether the mediator
was adequately qualified; whether representatives of key stakeholders
were at the table; whether the board ensured that all interested parties had
an opportunity to participate in a fair manner; whether the board ensured
that underrepresented or underfunded parties received sufficient techni-
cal or financial support from the board to be able to make effective
representations; the extent to which the board directed the process and
monitored compliance with relevant statutes and regulations (or re-
viewed the agreement subsequently to ensure compliance); and the extent
of the consensus among the parties. As Susan Sturm argues: "Under this
model [the deliberative model of public remedial decision-making] the
court's role is to structure a deliberative process whereby the stakeholders
in the public dispute develop a consensual remedial solution using
reasoned dialogue, and to evaluate the adequacy of this process and the
remedy that it produces."'25
123. P.J. Harter, "The Political Legitimacy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules" (1983)
32 Am. U. L. Rev. 471 at 485.
124. A.D. Reid, "Seeing Regulation Differently: An ADR Model of Policy Formulation,
Implementation and Enforcement" (1995-96) 9 C.J.A.L.P. 101 at 118.
125. "Normative Theory," supra note 122 at 1427.
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7. What Role Should Tribunals Play in Enforcing and Following Up
on Agreements Reached during Mediation?
At present, there are no tribunals in Canada that play an active role in
enforcing or monitoring agreements reached during mediation. Gener-
ally, when a settlement or agreement is given approval by a tribunal, it is
formally adopted by the tribunal as an order. Such orders are generally
enforceable in court in the same manner as court judgments. 2 6 When
settlements are not adopted by a tribunal as a formal Order, the tribunal
generally has no jurisdiction to enforce the agreement (for instance,
parties in a mediation may come to agreement, or parts of an agreement,
that are quite legal, but outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal-compen-
satory payments between companies and private land owners in reclama-
tion certificate disputes are an example). If the tribunal serves as a
recommending body to the minister, then the minister's final decision is
enforceable under the powers granted to that minister and his or her
ministry (but not to the tribunal).
In light of the above jurisdictional restriction, do tribunals have a role
to play in enforcing agreements reached using ADR processes? In our
view, while they do not have a formal and elaborate role, they do have a
limited but important role in ensuring "follow-up" and exercising influ-
ence, as necessary. Influence can be exercised in at least four ways. First,
boards can ensure that their rules of practice contain specific provisions
concerning procedures for rehearing or reopening cases that have previ-
ously been settled by board-approved agreements, but where one party or
more argues that the terms have not been met and returns to the tribunal
for help. 127 Second, a board can hold some influence over compliance by
leaving a case open for some specified length of time so that any party can
easily re-enter the formal board process if another fails to comply with an
agreement reached during mediation. Third, boards can also act in an
126. For example, section 153 of the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.
E. 19, states that an order of the Environmental Appeal Board may be enforced as a judgment
of the Ontario Court (General Division) in court. In addition, section 19 of the Ontario Statutory
Powers Procedure Act R.S.O. 1990, c. s. 22 stipulates that, where any Order of a statutory
tribunal is filed with the Ontario Court (General Division), it is enforceable in the same manner
as a judgment of the court. In Alberta, section 93.1 of the Environmental Protection and
Enhancement Act states, S.A. 1992, c. E-13.3:
An order of the Board under section 88 or 89, a decision of the Board under section 90
and a decision of the Minister under section 92 may be filed with the clerk of the Court
of Queen's Bench and, on filing, are enforceable as if they were judgments of the Court.
127. For example, rule 20 of the Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board's
Rules of Practice gives it a wide discretion to review a prior order or decision, and may consider
"any relevant circumstance," including the fact that "the public interest in finality of decisions
is outweighed by the prejudice to the applicant."
Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices 99
informal way by seeking to persuade parties both during and after a
mediation of the necessity and advantages of adhering to their promises.
This may involve little more than a reminder phone call to one party, as
requested by another, regarding implementation. Fourth, mediators may
make themselves accessible to the parties to help with conflicts that arise
over implementation of agreements. 2 Generally, mediators offer to help
resolve future disputes during implementation and these provisions can
be written into agreements.
8. Should Mediated or Negotiated Agreements Have Precedent-Setting
Value ?
Under Canadian law, administrative tribunals are not bound by the
doctrine of stare decisis (i.e., they are not required to follow prior
decisions, which are not technically binding as precedent). 29 As noted by
Blake:
The principle of stare decisis does not apply to tribunals. A tribunal may
consider previous decisions on point to assist it in deciding the appropriate
order to make in the case at hand. If circumstances are similar, it may find
an earlier decision persuasive. However, it should not treat the earlier
decision as binding upon it, and should be open to argument as to why that
case ought not to be followed .... 30
For the same reason, environmental tribunals are not bound by prior
mediated or negotiated agreements, which have no formal value as
precedent under Canadian law. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that,
at present, no Canadian tribunals look to prior mediated agreements or
negotiated settlements as having formal precedent-setting value.'3 '
However, this is not to say that agreements or settlements should have
no future value whatsoever, with each new decision by the tribunal
completely blind to past practice and experience. As noted by Blake
above, although administrative tribunals are not bound by the doctrine of
128. Though this offer may extend Board member's responsibilities beyond that formally
granted to the Board, not to mention increase the burden of time on the mediator. Thus, when
and if Boards offer such services, it may be most appropriate when outside mediators have been
used rather than Board members themselves.
129. Practice and Procedure, supra note 20 at 6-7; Domtar Inc. v. Que, [ 1993] 2 S.C.R. 756.
130. S. Blake, Administrative Law in Canada, 2d ed., (Markham: Butterworths, 1997) at 113.
This is reiterated in the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board's Rules of Practice, which state:
In light of the discretionary nature of the Board's powers, it must decide each case
individually in light of the material before it in that particular case.., while the Board
will generally try to decide similar cases similarly, as a matter of law it must decide each
case on its own merits.
131. This question was asked during interviews with tribunal members from every Canadian
jurisdiction, and each responded in the negative.
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stare decisis, they can look to prior decisions, on a discretionary basis, for
general guidance or as persuasive authority. In our view, the same
approach is justified with regard to prior agreements or settlements.
While a tribunal cannot be bound by the content of previous negotiated
agreements, a tribunal may find it helpful to keep a database of prior
settlements and to examine them in analogous cases. In fact, independent
law reporters are now beginning to publish mediated settlements.132
We also argue that the degree of persuasiveness of prior agreements in
subsequent cases should vary according to the degree that settlements
were reviewed by the relevant tribunal. Thus, where a board has extensive
guidelines for the formal review of settlements (or formal review of the
process of settlement, as we have discussed above), as in the case of the
Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal discussed above, a
board-approved settlement would carry considerable weight. By con-
trast, where a settlement has not been reviewed, or where a board member
did not at least play a role in mediating the agreement, that agreement
should probably have less weight.
At the very least, a review of past cases can serve as a basis for
improving future mediations. Past cases can serve as valuable teaching
materials to help board members improve their decision-making and
mediation skills. 133
9. What Statutory Basis, if any, is Needed to Conduct Mediation
within the Context of Administrative Hearings?
At present, express statutory or regulatory provisions with regard to the
use of ADR in environmental administrative settings have been imple-
mented in five Canadian jurisdictions. However, the nature and specific-
ity of these provisions vary markedly. The most comprehensive statutory
132. For example, the mediated settlement in the case of Oyen was reported in the C.E.L.R.
Re Bitz, 23 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 266 (Alta. Environmental App. Bd).
133. For instance, cases from the Alberta Environmental Appeal Board have been used as the
basic fact patterns for two mediation simulations. The simulations are used to train new Board
members in various aspects of mediation.
Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices 101
provisions have been adopted under the Canadian Environmental As-
sessment Act, which sets out a detailed procedure for the use of media-
tion. 134 In Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba and Nova Scotia, statutory provi-
sions have also been implemented, although these are presented in more
general terms giving either the Minister or the tribunal the discretion to
implement ADR processes without setting out the specific nature or
134. Sections 29-32 of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th
Supp.), c. 16, set out a procedure for mediation. Once the decision to conduct a mediation has
been made, all "interested parties" (i.e. any person having an interest in the outcome of the
assessment for a purpose that is neither frivolous nor vexatious), must be identified. The
Minister appoints the mediator after consultation with the proponent, the relevant provincial
government and the interested parties. The mediator must be "unbiased and free from any
conflict of interest" and must have "knowledge or experience in acting as a mediator." The
Minister also fixes the terms of reference of the mediation. Anything said by the mediator or
an interested party during the mediation is privileged, although not necessarily confidential.
Thus, no evidence of such statements is admissible in any legal proceeding without the consent
of the person who made the statement. However, the interested parties are free to disclose each
other's statements to any person for any purpose outside a legal proceeding, unless a
confidentiality agreement is signed at the commencement of the mediation. At the conclusion
of the mediation, the mediator must submit a report to the Minister and the responsible
authority. The responsible authority makes the final decision, but has the obligation to consider,
and if the federal cabinet approves, respond to the mediator's report. If the mediation falls to
resolve the dispute and the matter goes to a full public hearing, the remaining unresolved issues
will be determined without reference to the mediation. The formal CEAA mediation process
was introduced by legislation in 1993. Since that time, the CEAA has not had the opportunity
to employ the mediation process in practice.
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modalities of the processes to be implemented.'35 In the latter four
jurisdictions, specific details concerning the nature and modalities of
ADR processes are found in the Rules of Practice or Guidelines of the
relevant tribunals. 136 Finally, there are no specific statutory or regulatory
135. For example, section Il of the EnvironmentalAppeal BoardRegulation, Alta. Reg. 114/
93, stipulates that the Board "may, prior to conducting the hearing of the appeal, on its own
initiative or at the request of any of the parties, convene a meeting of the parties and any
interested persons the Board considers should attend, for the purpose of . . . mediating a
resolution of the subject matter of the notice of objection... " Similarly, section 8 of the
Ontario Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 18, stipulates that the Minister
"may" appoint one or more persons to act as mediators "who shall endeavour to resolve such
matters as may be identified by the Minister as being in disputes or of concern in connection
with the undertaking". Along similar lines, section 34 of the Ontario Environmental Bill of
Rights , S.O. 1993, c.28, reads as follows:
34 (1) A minister may appoint a mediator to assist in the resolution of issues related to
a proposal for an instrument of which notice has been given ....
(2) A minister shall not make an appointment under subsection (1) without the consent
of the person applying for the instrument or the person who would be subject to the
instrument, as the case may be.
121 (1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations,
(o) respecting mediation under section 34, including but not limited to regulations
respecting the costs of mediation, the confidentiality of representations made during
mediation and the procedures to be followed in mediation.
Section 14 of the Nova Scotia Environment Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 1, stipulates that the
Minister has the discretion to "refer a matter to a form of alternative dispute resolution,
including but not limited to, conciliation, negotiation, mediation or arbitration" and that the
Minister may appoint "an independent party or neutral third party" to "facilitate, mediate or
arbitrate."
Finally, section 3(3) of the Manitoba Environment Act, S.M. 1987-88, c. 26, reads as follows:
The minister may, where the minister deems it advisable, and where the conflicting
parties concur, appoint an environmental mediator acceptable to the parties to mediate
between persons involved in an environmental conflict, and the mediator so appointed
shall, within six weeks after completion of the mediation, report to the minister the
results of the mediation.
The recently enacted Manitoba Contaminated Sites Remediation Act S.M. 1996, c.40 contains
similar provisions.
136. For example, the Ontario Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board, in its Rules of
Practice, has drawn up extensive rules of procedures with respect to settlement conferences,
including detailed "Guidelines for Board-Appointed Facilitators and Mediators" and a
"Protocol for Consideration of Agreements". The Alberta Environmental Appeal Board has
similarly detailed provisions with respect to "pre-hearing meetings" in its Rules of Practice. To
date, no such formal Rules of Practice have been adopted in either Nova Scotia or Manitoba,
where ADR processes have been implemented largely on an ad hoc basis.
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provisions authorizing ADR in Quebec. However, pursuant to section 6.3
of the Environmental Quality Act, which states that the BAPE has a
mandate to "inquire into any question relating to the quality of the
environment submitted to it by the Minister," and section 6.6, which gives
the BAPE wide discretion to design its own procedures,'37 the BAPE has
designed and adopted detailed rules for environmental mediation.1
38
Conclusion
From our survey, the statutory basis for ADR in the administration of
environmental law, particularly in regard to tribunals, is still undevel-
oped. In this light, the question arises whether more detailed statutory
changes should be adopted with respect to the use of mediation and other
forms of ADR. In our view, this would be desirable for two reasons. First,
under Canadian law, administrative tribunals derive their powers solely
from statute or regulation. If a tribunal is not properly empowered by
statute or regulation to implement ADR, it runs the risk of acting outside
its jurisdiction by implementing such reforms unilaterally. 39 Second,
detailed statutory or regulatory provisions lend legitimacy to ADR and
have the effect of encouraging a more consistent, presumably fairer, and
certainly better informed approach across tribunals. 40
137. Section 6.6 stipulates that the BAPE has an obligation to adopt "rules of procedure
relating to the conduct of public hearings." According to Joanne Gelinas of the BAPE, it was
the BAPE (pursuant to this power), and not the Minister, which has been the principal system
design architect for its own mediation procedure.
138. These are found in the Rkgles deprocidure relatives au d~roulement des mdiations en
environnement. Pursuant to these rules, the BAPE's mediations have five main stages as
described in note 59, supra.
139. We refer to this as merely a "risk" because it is also well-established under Canadian law
that an administrative agency is the "master of its own procedure." See generally Practice and
Procedure, supra note 20 at 9-1, Prassad v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 560. In many
jurisdictions, the government has given statutory weight to this legal principle by enacting
provisions which explicitly delegate to administrative tribunals the power to make rules with
regard to their own practice and procedure. A good example is section 25.1 of the Ontario
Statutory Powers ProceduresAct, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22. In addition, even if some tribunals have
not been given the explicit power to implement ADR processes, their statutory mandates are
often sufficiently broad to encompass such processes. For example, both the Alberta Environ-
mental Appeal Board and the Quebec BAPE have all the powers of a commissioner under the
public inquiries statutes in their respective provinces (which powers are very broad).
140. As noted by an interviewee from the Nova Scotia Environmental Assessment Board,
where ADR reforms are implemented on an ad hoc basis, and where the public is not properly
informed in advance concerning the nature of the process and the applicable rules, it tends to
be skeptical.
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As an objection to the above position, it may be argued that the
implementation of overly detailed statutory provisions "ties the hands" of
administrative tribunals with respect to the design of their own practices
and procedures. 4 ' In particular, it might be argued that administrative
tribunals are better placed than legislators to design and implement the
terms under which they use ADR because they have more experience
with their own procedures and better understand the practical problems
and challenges they face. Furthermore, given that one of the purported
advantages of mediation is the opportunity to tailor its application in each
dispute, legislating and regulating mediation could seem counterproduc-
tive.
However, we propose that both tribunals and legislators have a unique
opportunity, given the relative infancy of mediation in the Canadian
environmental administrative context, to carefully balance statutory
versus regulatory requirements. We propose a Model Law (Appendix III)
that would provide a starting point for the implementation of ADR in each
jurisdiction. In making the policy choices required to transform the
Model Law into more appropriate legislation, regulation, or simply
guidance, legislators and tribunal members should consult, discuss, and
work together with those they serve. Such a process has already been
successful in Quebec and Alberta, where government bodies have been
receptive to ADR proposals suggested by administrative tribunals, and
have worked with these tribunals to help institutionalize appropriate
reforms.
141. Although administrative tribunals are "masters" of their own procedure under Canadian
law, it is also well-established that "to the extent that Parliament [or a legislature] has set out
procedure in legislation, an agency is bound by that procedure. It cannot impose procedures that
conflict with that legislative direction unless the legislation gives it authority to do so."
Practical Procedure, supra note 20 at 9-13.
Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices 105
APPENDIX I: ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS EXERCISED BY CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL TRIBUNALS
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(a) It is the policy of this government that disputes before environ-
mental administrative boards be resolved as fairly and as
efficiently as possible, and that these boards increase their
responsiveness to the needs and interests of the parties in-
volved.
(b) This government also recognizes that the burdens and responsi-
bilities of environmental administrative boards are increasing
and that their available budgets and resources are decreasing.
[COMMENTARY: Many board members interviewed expressed con-
cerns with regard to government cutbacks and shrinking budgets. Many
board hearings are lengthy and expensive for both the board and the parties
involved, and boards are actively looking for alternatives at present.]
(c) It is the policy of this government that maximum efficiency and
responsiveness in the resolution of environmental administra-
tive disputes will be achieved by developing and using alterna-
tive dispute resolution procedures in appropriate aspects of the
operations and processes of administrative boards.
(d) The advantages of alternative dispute resolution are well-docu-
mented, and include reduced administrative and legal costs,
more efficient use of board resources, reduction in the length of
hearing times, greater responsiveness to the interests of the
parties involved, and the more effective promotion of consensus.
[COMMENTARY: There was virtually unanimous agreement among the
board members interviewed that, in this climate of governmental austerity,
alternative dispute resolution reforms are desirable because they reduce
costs and save time for both boards and parties. In addition, many board
members expressed the view that alternative dispute resolution processes
increase the responsiveness of boards to the interests of the parties and
thereby increase the overall legitimacy of the administrative process. Many
parties who appear before these boards are laypersons and are not experi-
enced with formal board procedures. They generally prefer the informality
and flexibility of alternative dispute resolution procedures.]
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(e) This government recognizes that alternative dispute resolution
procedures are notappropriate in all cases and, in particular,
where fundamental matters of legislative policy and principle,
or the public interest are at issue.
[COMMENTARY: Most board members interviewed agreed that alter-
native dispute resolution processes are not effective in resolving disputes
with fundamental matters of principle at stake. In addition, as discussed
in the text of the paper, many boards have a statutory mandate to protect
the environment and/or the public interest. Where a negotiated settlement
comes into conflict with the public interest, these boards have a duty to
intervene and ensure that the public interest is adequately protected.
DEFINITIONS
"alternative dispute resolution" - refers to any procedure used to
resolve administrative environmental disputes other than a formal
board hearing, including negotiation, facilitation, mediation, fact
finding and arbitration.
"board"- refers to any administrative board, tribunal, bureau, com-
mission or agency with a legislative mandate to resolve environmen-
tal disputes, or to advise the government or conduct public hearings
concerning environmental disputes or questions of policy with re-
gard to the environment.
[COMMENTARY: There are a spectrum of administrative boards and
processes established under both federal and provincial environmental
legislation. Generally, boards function in one of three (sometimes over-
lapping) modes: (1) judicial or quasi-judicial (2) administrative and (3)
legislative. When functioning in one mode or the other, environmental
agencies will also be expected to undertake very different tasks, including
investigations reporting to and advising the Minister, adjudication and
appeals, and rule-making and standard-setting, among others. Alterna-
tive dispute resolution processes must be designed with the specific
legislative mandate of the board in mind.]
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1) Each board may develop and use its own alternative dispute
resolution procedures, rules and guidelines.
(2) Alternative dispute resolution procedures, rules and guide-
lines developed and used under this Act supplement and do not
limit other alternative dispute resolution procedures, rules and
guidelines made available by administrative boards.
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[COMMENTARY: At present, most of the alternative dispute resolution
reforms implemented in the Canadian environmental administrative
context have been developed and introduced by the boards directly, as
opposed to the legislatures. It is our view that statutory reform is
important to ensure that boards are properly authorized to implement
alternative dispute resolution reforms, and also to ensure a degree of
standardization. However, it must also be recognized that the boards
themselves have an important system design role to play by virtue of their
day-to-day exposure to their particular problems and challenges. Ideally,
governments and boards will work together to ensure that reforms which
are mutually satisfactory are implemented in both legislative form and in
the form of board rules of practice and guidelines.]
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
(1) Alternative dispute resolution procedures should be employed
by every board as the first stage in its dispute resolution
process. Where such procedures are not employed as the first
stage, they should be employed as early as possible in the
dispute resolution process.
[COMMENTARY: There are many advantages to the early use of
alternative dispute resolution, including: the opportunity to avoid a
formal hearing process, the opportunity to focus on interests instead of
positions, the opportunity to streamline the process by reducing the
number of parties and scoping issues, and the opportunity to commence
an early dialogue among the parties. In interviews with board members,
they informed us that the early use of the alternative dispute resolution
process also increases public legitimacy. Many members of the public
have no experience with the administrative process and do not feel
comfortable with a formal hearing. They prefer the relative informality
of alternative dispute resolution.]
(2) Alternative dispute resolution procedures should be offered
and encouraged by Boards, but the power of decision to utilize
alternative dispute resolution should be left with the parties.
[COMMENTARY: There are advantages to mandatory mediation. First,
there is evidence that mandatory mediation may be helpful in convincing
initially resistant parties that compromises and cooperation are useful in
resolving differences. Second, mandatory mediation may have the posi-
tive effect of educating a broader range of disputants concerning the
existence and benefits of alternative dispute resolution. However, Boards
risk undermining the fundamental principles of alternative dispute reso-
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lution, particularly mediation, if they require participation as a matter of
course. ADR is underpinned by the principles of voluntary participation
and self-determination. Weaker parties may feel coerced to settle, unin-
tentionally foregoing their right to a fair and balanced hearing. In many
cases where the parties either have fundamental principles at stake or are
too entrenched to jointly craft a resolution, alternative dispute resolution
would simply become another needless, frustrating and expensive step on
the way to a formal Board hearing.]
(3) Alternative dispute resolution procedures at four different
stages of board proceedings are typically available:
(a) Informal Ex Parte Meeting - the person designated by the
board to resolve the dispute or another board staff designated
to conduct case intake, can hold ex parte meetings with indi-
vidual parties or groups of individual parties, prior to the
formal commencement of the ADR or formal proceeding, to
discuss their claims, interests and resources, and to discuss
their willingness to resolve the dispute pursuant to alternative
dispute resolution processes.
[COMMENTARY: The advantages of this procedure include the oppor-
tunity for parties to discuss their interests openly and on a without
prejudice basis, and for mediators/facilitators to scope issues and employ
"shuttle diplomacy," if appropriate, to produce an early resolution. The
success of mediation, especially in complex substantive disputes, is
highly dependent on the ability of the mediator to work with parties
individually prior to the mediation to identify, scope, frame, and narrow
issues. Although these advantages must be balanced against the disad-
vantages of employing an ex parte process, which may create a perception
of bias or unfairness on the part of the board, boards will significantly
hinder their ability to mediate successfully without pre-mediation efforts.
As long as the board member serving as mediator does not sit on the
formal hearing panel and is prohibited from speaking about the case to
those Board members hearing the case, the protections granted by ex
parte prohibitions should be retained. Only when a board fulfills a highly
quasi-judicial role and exercises a final power of decision, should it
perhaps avoid such ex parte processes. ].
(b) Informal All Parties Meeting - the person designated by the
board to resolve the dispute can hold meetings with all inter-
ested parties, as opposed to ex parte, individual conversations,
prior to the commencement of either a settlement conference of
formal proceedings, to discuss their claims, interests, resources,
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and to discuss their willingness to resolve the dispute pursuant
to alternative dispute resolution processes.
[COMMENTARY: The advantages of this procedure include the oppor-
tunity for parties to discuss their interests more openly than in a formal
setting and on a without prejudice basis, the opportunity to focus on
interests instead of positions, the opportunity to streamline the process by
reducing the number of parties and scoping issues, and the opportunity to
commence an early dialogue among the parties. At this time, the board
may conclude from the information presented that ADR is appropriate,
and encourage the parties to take part. However, the disadvantage of
employing such a process, as compared to an ex parte process, is that the
parties may feel less comfortable discussing their interests candidly in
front of one another.]
(c) Assisted Settlement Conference - the person designated by the
board to resolve the dispute can hold a settlement conference
where the parties are provided a mediator to help them settle
the dispute The settlement conference is considered part of
board proceedings, but is a step before and separate from the
hearing, and may be conducted in private.
[COMMENTARY: The settlement conference assisted by a mediator
can be employed in addition, and as a subsequent step, to an ex parte or
all parties meeting. In contrast to the latter two processes, the primary
focus of this process is to help the parties reach a negotiated settlement.
However, in furtherance of this objective, it is our view that informal
preliminary meetings held prior to a formal mediation are highly advis-
able. These preliminary meetings allow the mediator/facilitator to prop-
erly inform the parties concerning alternative dispute resolution process
options, to focus and clarify issues, and to develop an agenda for the
mediation. In addition, at either the preliminary meeting or the settlement
conference/mediation itself, it should be made very clear to the parties
that this process is distinct from the formal hearing process, and that it will
be conducted on a without prejudice basis with the requisite privacy and
confidentiality protections. During these assisted settlement confer-
ences, it may be very useful for the mediator to hold individual "cau-
cuses" with the parties in order to advance settlement.]
(d) Preliminary Hearing - the person designated by the board to
resolve the dispute can hold a preliminary hearing, which is
considered part of the formal hearing process and is conducted
in public by a member or members of the hearing panel. The
purpose of the preliminary hearing is either to achieve a
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settlement of the dispute or one or more of the issues pertaining
to the dispute, or to further one or more procedural objectives
including, among others, identifying the parties and partici-
pants, and the scope of their participation in the hearing,
identifying, defining, simplifying and scoping issues, resolving
procedural and scheduling issues concerning the hearing, and
hearing preliminary motions. A mediator is not employed in
this preliminary hearing. Rather, the board member(s) acts in
their full and formal capacity.
[COMMENTARY: The advantages of this procedure are that, even if the
parties are unable to reach a settlement, the board will nonetheless have
the opportunity to increase the efficiency of the hearing process by
reducing the number. During preliminary ex parte or all party meeting
conversations, the Board ought to be able to determine if a settlement
conference with mediation, a preliminary hearing, or some combination
of the two is most appropriate.]
(4) Alternative dispute resolution processes should be employed in
the following order:
(i) ex parte and all party informal meetings, (ii) assisted settle-
ment conferences (mediation) and, if necessary, (iii) prelimi-
nary hearing.
(5) With respect to all alternative dispute resolution processes, the
board must fully and properly inform the parties from the
outset concerning the nature of the alternative dispute resolu-
tion process and its advantages, and the procedural steps
involved.
[COMMENTARY: A common concern expressed by tribunal members
during the interview process was that alternative dispute resolution is not
sufficiently understood by the public. Many parties who appear before
administrative tribunals are private citizens who have no experience with
formal Board hearings and do not understand the process. Alternative
dispute resolution is still "foreign" to them and, when the public does not
understand the process, they often assume that it is "simply more
bureaucratic decisionmaking." In order to ensure the success of alterna-
tive dispute resolution reforms, it is necessary to educate the public
concerning the advantages of alternative dispute resolution, and make the
administrative process more "user friendly" for citizens].
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(6) To the extent possible, the board should permit the parties to
participate in the design of the alternative dispute resolution
process in their particular case.
[COMMENTARY: During interviews, board members generally ex-
pressed the view that alternative dispute resolution processes are more
effective where the mediators/facilitators meet with the parties at the
outset to discuss and plan the process together. However, this is not
always necessary or possible. The mediation process designed by the
BAPE in Quebec, which has been very successful, is set out in its rules
of practice and cannot be changed by the parties.]
(7) To the extent possible, the board should seek to bring represen-
tatives of all appropriate 'stakeholding interests into alterna-
tive dispute resolution processes to ensure that the public
interest is adequately represented.
[COMMENTARY: If all key stakeholder interests are represented at the
table, then the "public interest" is more likely to be served. In addition to
serving the public interest, inclusion of all key stakeholding groups is
likely to increase the durability and enforceability of any agreement
reached. Parties left out of such alternative dispute resolution processes
may be more likely to challenge and undermine agreements reached
without their consent. This suggests that one of the most important ways
that a tribunal can ensure that the public interest is met in a mediation is
to work very hard at the outset to bring appropriate representation of all
stakeholder groups to the table. This might entail going well beyond
merely publicizing the fact that mediation is about to proceed and in
addition, to make explicit efforts (through Board staff) to reach out to
public interest groups and invite them to become involved. Boards may
also want to consider less formal and more inclusive rules of standing, if
possible, for participation in mediation versus more formal processes.]
APPOINTMENT OF MEDIATORS/FACILITATORS
APPOINTMENT AND TRAINING
(1) Alternative dispute resolution processes can be conducted by
four different classes of persons:
(a) board members on the designated hearing panel;
(b) board members not on the designated hearing panel;
[COMMENTARY: In our view, if mediations are to be conducted by
board members, it is necessary for them to be conducted by board
members who are not on the designated hearing panel. Mediations are
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more effective where the mediator is neutral and has no effective power
of decision. Thus, only preliminary hearings as part and parcel of full
board hearings should be conducted by board members on the designated
hearing panel.
(c) board staff members; and
[COMMENTARY: At present, no Canadian boards use staff members as
mediators, although several boards are considering this option. The
advantage of using staff members in this manner is that they often have
a great deal of expertise concerning the board's mandate, and board
processes. Where they are properly trained, they can accordingly be very
effective. The disadvantage of using staff is that they do not have either
the perceived authority of a board member or the perceived independence
of a neutral. At the least, board staff members may be most effective in
conducting ex parte or all party meetings to scope issues and develop
focused agendas prior to mediator-assisted settlement conferences.]
(d) independent professionals.
[COMMENTARY: At present, independent professionals are used on a
limited basis by some boards in Canada. Nonetheless, due to the limited
staff and resources of many boards, it is apparent that the use of neutral
mediators will become increasingly necessary in the future. However,
many board members expressed concern about controlling the quality
and the actions of independent professionals. Even where independent
professionals have training as mediators, many do not have expertise
concerning the board's mandate, public interest responsibilities and
board processes. In addition, some board members expressed concern
that independent mediators may be too directive in style in order to
achieve settlement and protect/enhance their reputation.]
(2) No person should be appointed to conduct an alternative
dispute resolution process unless that person is trained or has
experience concerning:
(a) mediation or facilitation techniques;
(b) substantive issues raised in a given dispute; and,
(c) the statutory mandate and public interest responsibilities of
the board.
[COMMENTARY: During interviews, many board members expressed
the concern that it is difficult to find mediators who are knowledgeable
concerning mediation techniques, the statutory mandate and public
interest responsibilities of the board, and the substantive issues raised in
a given dispute. Ideally mediators will have all three of these qualities.
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However, if it is necessary to choose, it is in our view essential that
mediators at least be properly trained concerning mediation techniques.]
(3) All boards must implement policies or programs to ensure that
board members, board staff members and independent profes-
sionals involved in conducting alternative dispute resolution
processes are fully and properly trained as mediators or facili-
tators.
NEUTRALITY OF MEDIATORS
(1) All mediators and facilitators will remain non-partisan in
regard to substantive outcomes in alternative dispute resolu-
tion proceedings. The mandate of the mediator is to assist the
parties in an impartial manner to conduct constructive nego-
tiations and pursue creative problem-solving.
[COMMENTARY: It has been our experience that mediations are
successful only where the mediator/facilitator adopts a neutral role.
However, where the statutory mandate of a particular board dictates, it
may be necessary for the board to require the mediator to narrow his or
her neutrality in order to protect the public interest. In Ontario, for
example, the Environmental Assessment and Appeal Board requires
mediators to ensure that "negotiations and agreements will reflect the
primary importance of environmental conservation and protection," to
"inform the parties of pertinent Board policy" and to "identify relevant
environmental information or other concerns which have not been
addressed or adequately resolved by the parties."]
(2) When board members serve as mediators, they may step
outside of the non-partisan, facilitative role, when, and only if
necessary, to protect the public interest and/or to narrow the
scope of issues for hearing if the parties agree an impasse has
arisen and settlement cannot be reached in mediation.
[COMMENTARY: If a board has an explicit public interest mandate, the
board member as mediator may have to step outside of his/her purely non-
partisan, facilitative role. When a tribunal member steps outside of the
mediative role, several limiting conditions must necessarily be met: (1)
the parties must be informed that the tribunal member as mediator may
step out of the mediative role, and under what conditions, before media-
tion begins; (2) the tribunal member must remain true to the rules of
confidentiality (nothing said in mediation that goes beyond that required
in formal discovery processes, such as settlement offers, will be used in
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later formal proceedings and the mediator is bound to not pass on
information revealed in meditation to the tribunal, formally or infor-
mally); (3) the tribunal member must not later serve as a formal panel
member; (4) the mediator must be clear when he or she is moving out of
the impartial role to provide substantive advice to the parties; (5) that
advice must be clearly stated as non-binding advice which does not
preclude the parties from terminating the mediation and going before the
tribunal in formal proceedings; (6) the mediator should work with the
parties in a non-partisan matter to flesh out all issues and interests, explore
options for settlement, and seek agreement first, with good faith and fair
effort, before moving into a quasi-judicial role; and, (7) the mediator
should be protected from acting as final arbiter of an agreement by one,
being able to remove her or himself from the mediation if necessary, and
two, having the tribunal (or the Minister) review agreements after they are
reached in mediation.
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES/ MEDIATIONS
(1) Where a settlement conference assisted by mediation is em-
ployed, the process should not be conducted or supervised by
a board member on the designated hearing panel.
[COMMENTARY: In our view, if mediations are to be conducted by
board members, it is necessary for them to be conducted by board
members who are not on the designated hearing panel.]
(2) The role of a mediator in a Settlement Conference is facilita-
tive, not directive. The mediator must fully explain to the
parties from the outset that his or her role is to help them
negotiate a settlement to the dispute, and not to resolve the
dispute for them.
[COMMENTARY: It has been our experience that facilitative mediation
techniques are more effective in the environmental field than directive
mediation techniques. However, where individual boards have statutory
mandates to protect the public interest or the environment, mediators may
have to remind the parties of the limits to and parameters constraining
agreements reached.]
(3) Where a settlement conference/mediation does not result in a
negotiated settlement of the dispute, the mediator or facilitator
cannot participate in the subsequent formal board hearing.
[COMMENTARY: This is essential for the purposes of preserving both
mediator neutrality and board neutrality].
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(4) Where board staff participate in a settlement conference/
mediation by providing procedural or informational support,
they should not participate in the subsequent formal board
hearing.
[COMMENTARY: This is essential for the purposes of preserving board
neutrality and neutralizing any concerns with regard to confidentiality.
However, this rule must be interpreted reasonably. Due to limited board
staff and resources, it is clear that staff involved in mediations/settlement
conferences will periodically have to play some role in subsequent
hearing proceedings. If so, they can protect the confidentiality of the
parties by ensuring, in subsequent hearing proceedings, that they play a
purely procedural role. In addition, they should undertake not to divulge
confidential information obtained at the mediation/settlement confer-
ence during the hearing.]
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS
(1) Where a Preliminary Hearing is employed, the process must be
supervised by a board member. It is also preferable that the
board member also be a member of the designated hearing
panel.
[COMMENTARY: Since a preliminary hearing is designed not only to
facilitate a settlement, but also to streamline the board hearing process,
it is preferable to have a member of the panel present during the
preliminary hearing. However, this is not strictly necessary, and the
preliminary hearing can be conducted by a board member who will not
sit on the panel.]
CONFIDENTIALITY
(1) Where a board's statutory mandate permits, confidentiality
should be protected during the course of alternative dispute
resolution processes.
[COMMENTARY: In some cases, the statutory mandate of a board does
not permit the protection of confidentiality. For example, the BAPE in
Quebec has a statutory obligation to conduct open hearings with full
public disclosure. The inability to protect confidentiality may undermine
the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution processes by discour-
aging the parties from openly discussing their interests. However, this is
a tradeoff that may be necessary under a given statutory regime. If
informal, ex parte, individual communications are allowed, the board
should, at the least, protect the confidentiality of these communications].
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(2) Where a board's statutory mandate permits, the following
confidentiality protections should form part of the relevant
board rules or guidelines:
(a) papers or documents produced during alternative dispute
resolution processes concerning the issues in dispute should be
confidential and inadmissible before a board, review panel,
court or tribunal without the consent of the participant or
mediator;
[COMMENTARY: In some cases, a balance may have to be struck
between the public interest in disclosure and the private interests of the
parties in protecting confidentiality. In Nova Scotia, for example, the
Environmental Assessment Regulations and Environmental Board Regu-
lations protect the confidentiality of business documents and informa-
tion, but contain an exception where these documents or information
relate to the "environmental effects or associated mitigation measures of
the undertaking." Whether confidentiality protections should include
such an exception should depend upon the specific statutory mandate of
the board in question.]
(b) no statement made by a participant or the mediator during
alternative dispute resolution processes concerning the issues
in dispute should be admissible before a board, review panel,
court or tribunal without the consent of the participant or
mediator.
[COMMENTARY: Preferably, the agreement is the only written out-
come of the mediation. However, where the Board has a mandate to
conduct public hearings, as in Quebec, it will be necessary for a transcript
of the proceedings to be prepared, and to be disclosed to the public.
Although this will diminish the effectiveness of the mediation, it may be
necessary for the purpose of satisfying the board's statutory mandate.]
(3) A board or court has the power to waive the protection of
confidentiality where it determines that disclosure is necessary
to prevent a manifest injustice, establish a violation of law, or
prevent harm to the public health or safety.
[COMMENTARY: This exception to the confidentiality protection
protects against two potential problems: (1) parties who choose to use
mediation precisely because they want a blanket confidentiality protec-
tion in subsequent hearing or court proceedings and (2) serious breaches
of law or public policy. The breadth of this exception should vary
depending upon the nature of the board's statutory mandate.]
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LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ISSUES
(1) Board members and board staff should employ best efforts at
the outset of alternative dispute resolution processes to deter-
mine whether the parties have adequate legal and technical
expertise to properly address the issues raised in the dispute.
Where one or all parties do not have adequate legal and
technical expertise, board members and staff should employ
best efforts to provide them with such expertise.
[COMMENTARY: In implementing this provision, boards must balance
their interest in ensuring that all the necessary information for a fair
negotiation is available to the parties with their interest in protecting the
public perception of neutrality on the part of mediators and the board.]
(2) Any scientific, legal or technical expertise provided by the
board or board staff must be equally and openly available to all
parties to the dispute. Parties may agree that only one or a few
parties to the dispute require particular assistance because
that party lacks sufficient resources.
(3) Where resources permit, boards should establish a trust fund
to enable parties without sufficient resources to a dispute to
obtain adequate legal and technical advice during alternative
dispute resolution processes. Such funding and advice must be
administered with fair, balanced, and clear procedures, such
as access based on equal access for all, access based on finan-
cial-need, and so forth.
[COMMENTARY: During interviews, many board members expressed
concerns with respect to power differentials in environmental disputes,
which frequently pit individual citizens or environmental interest groups
against industry or government. Often private citizens do not have
sufficient access to technical, scientific and legal resources to properly
represent their own interests in mediation or negotiation. This raises a
difficult dilemma for the board, which must make a policy decision
whether to have its mediators adopt a neutral stance, or whether to attempt
to "level the playing field" by providing additional advice or funding.
This choice will depend upon the nature of the board's statutory mandate,
and the strength of its interest in maintaining a publicly neutral stance.]
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REVIEW OF AGREEMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS
(1) Where a board has a legislative mandate to review agreements
and settlements reached during alternative dispute resolution
processes, it must ensure that they conform with the purposes
and provisions of the relevant legislation and the public inter-
est.
[COMMENTARY: In some cases, the board will not have the statutory
mandate to review negotiated agreements. This may occur (1) with
respect to cases where the parties enter into an agreement prior to the
board acquiring jurisdiction over the matter, or (2) where the jurisdiction
to review agreements lies with the Minister and not the board. Where a
board holds a public interest mandate, this review will ensure agreements
reached in settlement conferences protect that interest.
(2) In undertaking a full review of an agreement or settlement, the
board should take into account both the substantive content of
the agreement and the fairness of the alternative dispute
resolution process.
[COMMENTARY: It is desirable for boards to implement guidelines
concerning the proper practice and procedure to be followed in reviewing
agreements. In determining the intensity of the review, the board must
balance its interest in promoting settlements (which would necessitate a
less stringent standard of review) and its statutory mandate. Where the
board has a mandate to act in an administrative or advisory capacity and
has no final power of decision at a hearing, a less stringent standard of
review is appropriate. In such cases, the Minister retains full decision-
making authority, and the principle of democratic accountability is
maintained. By contrast, where the board exercises a final power of
decision, a more rigorous level of review is advisable. However, at the
same time, where such a rigorous standard is imposed, it must be
recognized that this may undermine the effectiveness of the mediation
process. Interjecting another administrative review and, at worst, forcing
a formal board hearing to review a settlement, could essentially render the
advantages of mediation moot.]
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PRECEDENT
(1) Boards are not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and have
no legal obligation to adhere to prior settlements or agreements
in subsequent alternative dispute resolution or hearing pro-
ceedings. However, it is a sound practice for boards to employ
prior agreements and settlements as guidance with respect to
both substance and procedure in subsequent alternative dis-
pute resolution processes.
[COMMENTARY: Generally, the extent to which the substance of a
negotiated agreement will have authority should vary according to the
level of board review or input into that agreement. Where the board has
fully reviewed the agreement, it should have persuasive authority close
to or equal to that of a board decision. Where the board has not reviewed
that agreement, its persuasive authority will generally be lower than that
of a board decision reached in a formal hearing. In addition, it is a sound
practice for board members and staff to meet periodically to discuss the
alternative dispute resolution process, and to exchange information
concerning effective techniques and possible improvements to the pro-
cess.]
ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS
(1) Where a board's statutory mandate permits, it should adopt
settlements and agreements reached between the parties as a
formal Order of the board.
[COMMENTARY: This grants the mediated agreement the full authority
of the board. This will not be possible in cases where the board has no
jurisdiction over particular types of settlement or where the board has no
power to issue formal Orders.]
(2) Settlements and agreements reached between the parties, and
adopted as a formal Order of the board, can be filed with any
Superior Court of general jurisdiction and are enforceable in
the manner of a court judgment.
[COMMENTARY: In many provinces, legislation already exists to
permit the filing of administrative board Orders with the Superior Court.]
(3) Every board retains the discretion, upon the application of one
or both parties to an agreement or settlement, to investigate an
alleged breach of said agreement or settlement. Where one or
both parties have breached an agreement, and where fairness
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or the public interest requires, the board may revoke the
agreement and hold a de novo hearing concerning the issues
and facts in the original dispute.
[COMMENTARY: The scope of this power will vary depending upon
the statutory mandate of the board in question. Where the board is acting
in an advisory capacity, and where the final power of decision rests with
the Minister, the board will generally have no jurisdiction to reopen an
agreement. However, where the board is acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity, and exercises a final power of decision, it should generally have
jurisdiction.]





We are the Consensus Building Institute, affiliated with the MIT-Harvard
Public Disputes Program. We have been retained by the Alberta Environ-
mental Appeal Board to prepare a White Paper concerning the best
practices that administrative environmental tribunals in Canada should
follow with regard to settlement, negotiation and mediation. We are very
interested in speaking with you about the use of mediation, if any, in your
tribunal's proceedings.
These interviews are confidential in the sense that we will not attribute
name, position, or organization to comments and opinions you express to
us. We would like to include any factual information on your program
and use of mediation, if any, in our paper. We would make sure you have
a chance to review this factual information in draft form.
Our conversation should take between 45 minutes and 1 hour of your
time.
II. GENERAL QUESTIONS
1. Please briefly describe your organization-its purpose and place
in provincial or federal government. Do you have any general
information-an annual report.for instance-you would be willing
to send us?
2. Please briefly describe your position in this organization.
III. QUESTIONS ABOUT MEDIATED CASES
(a) Implementation
* 1. Does your organization utilize mediation in any way in resolving
cases or in fulfilling its rule-making or administrative responsi-
bilities? If so, how? If not, why not?
*2. If so, is this mediation mandated by statute or regulation?
Regardless, are there are any relevant statutes or regulations
which prohibit or limit its use?
3. Who carries out the mediation (do you use your administrative
law judges to mediate, your staff, outside mediators)?
Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices 123
4. What process does your organization employ for the appoint-
ment of mediators if they are outside your ALJs (i.e. with regard
to qualifications, training and experience)?
(b) Record and Review
1. What kind of written materials are kept concerning these media-
tions or mediated settlements, if any? If recorded in some way,
do these cases ever serve as precedent, either formally in the
Board's activities, or more informally, informing later mediated
settlements?
*2. Does the Board review the mediated cases? If so, how (proce-
dural, substantive, etc.)? If so, who undertakes the review
(Chairman of Board, other members)? Has any settlement been
"thrown back" or "thrown out"?
3. Have any of your mediated agreements been subject to judicial
review by the courts? If so, what standard of review have the
courts employed? What was the outcome?
*4. What role does your organization play, if any, in enforcing
mediated settlements? Has your organization developed any
techniques to ensure ongoing monitoring and compliance?
(c) Evaluation
* 1. Have the mediation techniques implemented by your organiza-
tion been successful? How do you think that administrative
bodies should evaluate the success of mediation efforts or
settlements themselves?
2. How would you compare the investment of time (both for
administrative officials/mediators and for participants) that is
required in cases that are mediated as compared to cases that are
heard before the formally convened Board?
(d) General Conclusions
* 1. What concerns or worries do you have about mediation (whether
you have used it or not)?
*2. What do you think are the major advantages and disadvantages
of using mediation in cases that come before your Tribunal?
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IV. OTHER QUESTIONS
1. Do you have any written materials on your program you could
send us?
*2. Who else do you think it would be useful for us to speak with?
*3. Are you aware of any other administrative environmental tribu-
nals within your province, or in other provinces, which are using
or have tried to use mediation?
* Indicates questions asked of respondents whether or not they have current mediation
programs.
